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Introduction
Issues in immigration law often exist at the complex and confusing
intersection of the plenary power doctrine, constitutional law,
administrative law, and immigration law itself. Courts and legal scholars
have long struggled with difficult legal and theoretical problems in each of
these individual areas alone. It is not surprising then that, when combined,
these problems may become intractable. And when the case in which they
are confronted involves the permanent removal of a noncitizen from the
United States, perhaps a long-term lawful permanent resident (LPR) whose
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entire life and family are here, the consequences to their resolution are
magnified to the extreme. 1
One area that highlights what occurs when these areas of law overlap in a
single case involves waivers of inadmissibility under the former section
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and under the current
INA section 212(h). 2 Both of these waivers are frequently used to waive
criminal convictions for long-term LPRs so that such LPRs do not lose their
status and may remain legally in the United States. By the language alone
of these waivers, they apply only to noncitizens seeking admission into the
United States or otherwise subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. Both
212(c) and 212(h) waivers, however, have been the subject of extensive
litigation seeking to extend their reach to allow them to waive grounds of
deportability. The result of the intersection of constitutional, administrative,
and immigration law in this litigation appears to be, to put it simply, a mess.
The decisions are inconsistent, sometimes incoherent, and often irrational in
terms of both outcome and doctrine.
With respect to outcome, the courts have reached essentially the opposite
result in 212(c) and 212(h) cases: 212(c) is available to most noncitizens
seeking to waive charges of deportability while 212(h) is not. With respect
to doctrine, despite immigration exceptionalism’s insistence that Congress’
power over immigration is plenary and that the executive branch is
particularly deserving of deference in the immigration context, the courts
have applied general principles of administrative and constitutional law to
congressional and agency positions. Three major legal frameworks have
been involved in these decisions: (1) judicial deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.; 3 (2) arbitrary and capricious review of an agency’s
action under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA); 4 and (3) the guarantee of equal protection of the law under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Not only have
the courts considering these questions differed on how to interpret and
1. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a
drastic measure . . . .”); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that
deportation may result in not only loss of liberty but also “loss of both property and life; or
of all that makes life worth living”).
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act, commonly referred to as the “INA,” begins at
8 U.S.C. § 1101.
3. 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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apply particular portions of the legal standards, but they have also varied
widely as to which of these particular legal standards they discuss and even
whether they invoke any at all.
Despite these radical discrepancies in outcome and legal framework,
however, the 212(c) and 212(h) decisions can deepen our understanding of
immigration exceptionalism, immigration law today, and immigration law’s
intersection with administrative and constitutional law. The application of
ordinary administrative and constitutional law principles in these cases
demonstrates a clear continuing erosion of immigration exceptionalism and
the plenary power doctrine. Furthermore, there are significant parallels in
the courts’ analyses regardless of which of the three legal frameworks is
employed. Assessing whether an agency’s legal interpretation is reasonable
under step two of the Chevron analysis looks a great deal like analyzing
whether an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under section
706(2)(A) of the APA, which in turn looks a great deal like considering
whether there is a rational basis for a particular action under minimal
scrutiny equal protection review.
The courts themselves have only recently and rarely begun to note these
parallels and have never analyzed their significance. This failure is one
facet of a larger issue: the courts in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases have
primarily engaged in only a surface application of the constitutional and
administrative law principles discussed. I argue that this failure illustrates
the continuing effects of plenary power and immigration law
exceptionalism. Deeper attempts to explore what these doctrines mean,
address the many remaining questions regarding their application in the
immigration law context, and consider how the individual doctrines
interconnect will be the next step in the erosion of immigration
exceptionalism. Like the weakening of the plenary power doctrine thus far,
however, progress is likely to be slow, incremental, and non-linear.
Part I of this article will introduce the doctrinal frameworks: the plenary
power doctrine and the theory of immigration exceptionalism, Chevron
deference, arbitrary and capricious review, and equal protection rational
basis analysis. Part II will detail the development of the problem in the case
law regarding the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h) waivers to grounds of
deportability. Part III then contains the heart of the argument. I will argue
that the differences in outcome and application of doctrine between the
212(c) and 212(h) cases and even among each case type are irreconcilable.
Despite these irreconcilable differences, however, there are substantial
parallels in the factors the courts are actually considering in these cases. As
courts begin to acknowledge and explore these parallels and engage in a
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deeper analysis of the administrative and constitutional principles being
employed, the validity and hold of a theory of immigration exceptionalism
will continue to decline.
I. Doctrinal Frameworks
Immigration law is in many respects “special”: it is complicated,
intricate, and highly technical under the best of circumstances.5
Immigration law has also been understood to differ markedly from other
areas of the law, in particular with respect to questions of judicial review
and constitutionality. 6 Ordinary legal principles are not expected to apply in
the same way they might in other contexts, and outcomes that would be
unusual in other settings are not uncommon. This understanding is
sometimes described as a theory of “immigration exceptionalism.” 7 At its
core, immigration exceptionalism stems from the development of the
plenary power doctrine in a series of Supreme Court decisions from the late
1800s. 8 The plenary power doctrine means in effect that Congress has
absolute and unqualified power, immune from the threat of judicial review,
over choices regarding which noncitizens to admit into and deport from the
United States. 9 Courts allow constitutional violations against noncitizens in
5. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (“Those
hardy readers who have made it this far will surely agree with the ‘complexity’ point.”); cf.
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925 (1995) (“For more than a hundred years, the
Supreme Court of the United States has been telling us that immigration law is just plain
different.” (footnotes omitted)); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1299, 1301 (2011) (“What emerges from this discussion is the realization that
deportation does not fit neatly into the civil or criminal box, but rather that it lives in the
netherworld in between.”).
6. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era
of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 58 (2015) (“Immigration law
is most well-known among law professors for its marked departure from mainstream U.S.
constitutional law.”); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 925-26; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 59; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
307, 307 (2000); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999).
8. See Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-15 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
9. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 58-59.
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the immigration context that would be impermissible in other areas of
law. 10
Immigration exceptionalism also extends beyond the plenary power
doctrine. Hiroshi Motomura, for example, has defined it as “the view that
immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on
government decisionmaking . . . .” 11 Immigration and alienage law includes
all immigration or status-related matters affecting noncitizens in the United
States, not just laws relating to the entry and expulsion of noncitizens. 12
The plenary power doctrine focuses primarily on the relationship between
the courts and Congress—that is, between the judicial and the legislative
branches of government. Immigration exceptionalism is also concerned
with relationships between the courts and the immigration executive
agencies (the judicial and the executive branches), between Congress and
the immigration executive agencies (the legislative and executive
branches), and between federal law and state law.13
Immigration exceptionalism and the individual constitutional rights of
noncitizens have long existed in awkward tension with each other. Another
particularly significant aspect of immigration law exceptionalism today is
its intersection with doctrines of deference in administrative law. 14 A strong
application of the theory of immigration exceptionalism would suggest that
these constitutional and administrative “usual limits on government
decisionmaking” should have no role in immigration cases.15
Noncitizens and commentators alike have long criticized the plenary
power doctrine and debated the exact degree of deference to congressional

10. See, e.g., id.; cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its
broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”).
11. Motomura, supra note 7, at 1363.
12. See, e.g., id. at 1361. Commentators have even argued for further expansion of the
subject matter covered by a theory of immigration exceptionalism. See, e.g., Rachel E.
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1965, 1969 (2013) (arguing for a “broader understanding of immigration exceptionalism”
that focuses on the system’s procedural aspects and takes into consideration its implications
for both noncitizens and citizens).
13. Cf. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1671, 1672-76 (2007) (focusing on the distribution of authority between Congress and the
executive agencies and the judiciary’s role in influencing that distribution).
14. Cf. id. at 1671 (discussing the intersection of the plenary power doctrine and
administrative law doctrines of deference).
15. Motomura, supra note 7, at 1363.
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judgment it requires. 16 Although the demise of the plenary power doctrine
has been incorrectly predicted for decades, 17 the doctrine certainly is less
robust today than initially understood or intended.18 In recent years, as
courts have increasingly begun to apply ordinary principles of law in an
ordinary manner in immigration cases, scholars have not only recognized
the erosion of the plenary power doctrine but also questioned the continued
viability of a theory of immigration exceptionalism. 19 This trend is apparent
in the extensive case law in the context of 212(c) and 212(h) waivers.
Three “ordinary” principles of law have played a particular role in these
cases. Under the umbrella of administrative law, courts have invoked both
Chevron deference and arbitrary and capricious review under the APA. In
the constitutional law arena, courts have engaged in equal protection
review. This section will briefly introduce all three principles. Each of these
doctrines alone are, of course, complex and the subject of countless cases
and voluminous scholarship. This section is not intended to be a
comprehensive survey, but rather a simple introduction to the facets of the

16. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 5, at 925-26; Motomura, supra note 7, at 1363-64;
Motomura, supra note 6, at 550-62; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 287 (2000); Johnson, supra note 6, at 59-60; Michael Kagan, Plenary
Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27-29
(2015) (“A sober observer would point out that immigration law scholars have been
predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at least three decades.”);
Legomsky, supra note 5, at 936-37; Spiro, supra note 16, at 339-40.
18. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 220-22 (6th ed. 2015); Johnson, supra note 6, at 59-60, 60 n.7;
Legomsky, supra note 5, at 930-37; Motomura, supra note 7, at 1372-73; Motomura, supra
note 6, at 607-13; Rosenbloom, supra note 12, at 1983, 1983 n.129 (“A number of scholars
have chronicled the emergence of cracks in the plenary power doctrine over the decades.”);
Spiro, supra note 16, at 341-45; cf. Chin, supra note 17, at 258 (“At the time they were
decided, many of the terrible immigration cases could have come out the same way even if
they involved the rights of citizens under domestic constitutional law. It is not that any of the
cases were correctly decided, rather, it is that they could have been decided the same way
without resort to any claim that they were beyond the Constitution.”).
19. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 58-66; Kagan, supra note 17, at 21-23; cf. T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 9, 34 (1990) (calling for an end to immigration exceptionalism more than fifteen
years ago). But cf. Motomura, supra note 7, at 1393 (“The question of immigration
exceptionalism is considerably more nuanced. Immigration can be exceptional for some
purposes and not for others.”).
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principles and open questions that figure prominently in the case law on
212(c) and 212(h) discussed in Part II below.
A. Administrative Law
1. Chevron Deference
The Supreme Court in Chevron held that courts must defer to a
reasonable agency interpretation of the statute that agency is charged to
administer. 20 Prior to the Court’s decision in Chevron, judicial deference to
agency interpretations had been approached on a more ad hoc basis, with
multiple contradictory approaches existing in the case law.21 While at the
time the decision was issued Chevron was not viewed as a watershed, 22 it
quickly became a profoundly significant decision in administrative law.23

20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 13, at 1682 (“In fact, that was part of the point of
Chevron—to create a general, trans-substantive doctrine of administrative deference to
replace the more ad hoc approach to deference that had previously characterized
administrative law jurisprudence.”); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of
Nothing At All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2013) (“We
do not believe any single principle can either account for all pre-Chevron Supreme Court
decisions or—more to the point for this study—describe the views of all pre-Chevron lower
courts about the law prescribed by pre-Chevron Supreme Court decisions, but we do think
that such decisions and views converge on the key inquiry, implicit in Judge Friendly's
description in Pittston Stevedoring: whether the legal question decided by the agency and
under judicial review is a pure question of legal interpretation or a mixed question of law
application to a particular set of facts.”).
22. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 29-33 (“[W]hen Chevron was briefed
and argued in the Supreme Court, no one thought it was a case involving any serious,
general question about the standard of review for questions of law.”); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 975-76 (1992); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
512 (“It should not be thought that the Chevron doctrine—except in the clarity and the
seemingly categorical nature of its expression—is entirely new law.”).
23. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 2 (“Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., for which the doctrine is named, has become the most cited
case in federal administrative law, and indeed in any legal field, and the scholarship on
Chevron could fill a small library.” (footnotes omitted)); Scalia, supra note 22, at 512
("Chevron has proven a highly important decision—perhaps the most important in the field
of administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC. In the first
three and a half years after its announcement—up to the beginning of 1988—Chevron was
cited by lower federal courts over 600 times.” (footnote omitted)).
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The federal courts typically apply Chevron deference as a two-step test. 24
At step one, courts must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 25 If, on the other hand,
“the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the
courts move on to step two, where “the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”26
Within three years, the Supreme Court applied Chevron in an immigration
case. 27 The Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca held that Congress had
spoken clearly in defining refugees as those who have a “well-founded fear
of persecution” and that deference to the agency’s interpretation of that
language was therefore unwarranted. 28
The application of Chevron has not been nearly as straightforward as this
simple two-step test might suggest, however. Substantial questions left
unanswered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron remain at all
stages of the Chevron inquiry. 29 Each of these questions has arisen at times
in the immigration context. First, when, or to what type of agency
interpretations, does Chevron apply in the first instance? Scholars often call
this the “Chevron step zero” inquiry. 30 Second, how clearly must Congress
have spoken in the statute at issue? Asked otherwise, how should courts
determine Congress’ intent? What role do canons of statutory construction
play? 31 Finally, when is an agency’s interpretation reasonable or
permissible? How deeply should the courts scrutinize agency action and
24. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 59-60; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 83-84, 83 n.4 (1994). Even this basic structure, however, is a
matter of some debate. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of
Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141,
144, 144 n.10 (2012); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597-99 (2009).
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
26. Id. at 843.
27. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
28. Id. at 427-28, 446-50.
29. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 2-3.
30. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero,
76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 191 (2006).
31. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference,
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 517 (2003) (“One important issue left unresolved by the Court is
the role of canons of construction in the review of agency interpretations.”).
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conclusions at this stage of the inquiry? 32 Underlying all of these
unresolved issues is the question of what exactly deference means in the
first place, and therefore, what courts should be doing in applying the
Chevron two-step test. 33
2. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that a reviewing court must
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law . . . .” 34 Review under this section of the APA is
commonly referred to as “arbitrary and capricious review.” 35 How courts
should approach arbitrary and capricious review has evolved over time 36
and even today differs depending on the type of agency action being
reviewed. 37 Prior to the 1960s and 1970s, arbitrary and capricious review
strongly resembled the highly deferential rational basis test then used in
constitutional due process analysis. 38 Thereafter, courts began to engage in
more searching review under the same umbrella standard. 39 The Supreme
Court officially rejected any comparison with rational basis review in favor

32. Cf. Cox, supra note 13, at 1679, 1679 n.25 (taking the position on the opinions of
Posner and other judges strongly criticizing decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals
“that one cannot fit this apparent lack of deference into standard administrative law
doctrines”).
33. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1093 (2008); Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 9-10 (“[T]he word
'deference' is used in many different senses, and its usage is not always consistent even
within individual opinions. . . . Deference can mean anything from complete entrustment of
decisionmaking authority to another—essentially the absence of review—to a simple
acknowledgment that someone else has an opinion on the subject.” (footnote omitted)).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
35. Cf. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C.L.
REV. 721, 727 (2014) (“Arbitrary and capricious review is rooted in the Administrative
Procedure Act.”).
36. See, e.g., id. at 727-33; Heath A. Brooks, Case Comment: American Trucking
Associations v. EPA: The D.C. Circuit’s Missed Opportunity to Unambiguously Discard the
Hard Look Doctrine, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 268-69 (2003).
37. See, e.g., Virelli, supra note 35, at 724.
38. See, e.g., id. at 727; Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69.
39. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-417 (1971), is
commonly cited as the impetus for this development. See also, e.g., Virelli, supra note 35, at
727-733; Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69.
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of a less deferential standard in 1983 in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 40
Today, arbitrary and capricious review is also known as the “hard look
doctrine.” 41 As applied today, the doctrine requires courts to ensure that
agencies have engaged in reasoned decision-making by looking at both
procedural and substantive factors such as whether the agency considered
all relevant factors, “the existence and quality of the administrative record
supporting the agency’s decision, the presence and persuasiveness of the
agency’s explanation for that decision, and the ‘rational connection’
between the agency’s explanation and its ultimate policy position.” 42
Typically, courts use arbitrary and capricious review to review an agency’s
policy determinations. However, the line between a legal interpretation that
would trigger Chevron deference and a policy determination that would
trigger arbitrary and capricious review is, at best, fuzzy and, at worst, nonexistent. 43
B. Constitutional Law: Equal Protection
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits the federal government from depriving any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This means
essentially that the federal government must treat similarly situated people

40. 463 U.S. 29, 42-43, 43 n.9 (1983) (“The Department of Transportation suggests that
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a
statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause. We do not
view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by
Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory
mandate.”). But cf. Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69, 269 n.99 (“Although courts continue to
use phrases like ′rational basis′ and ′reasoned decision-making′ when performing arbitrary
and capricious review, the actual test being applied is not nearly as deferential as the
constitutional rational basis test.” (citations omitted)).
41. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 12-13 (“As the law has developed over
the past half-century, agency policy decisions—or at least policy decisions of threshold
consequence—are reviewed under the so-called 'hard look doctrine,' which requires agencies
to articulate the reasons behind their actions and requires courts to ensure agencies have
seriously considered both the problems before them and their relevant factors.”).
42. Virelli, supra note 35, at 727-29 (footnotes omitted).
43. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 13 (“Unfortunately, the line between
agency policymaking and agency law-finding is anything but sharp, especially in a world
from which the nondelegation doctrine has been largely expunged.”); cf. Claire R. Kelly,
The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second Step as Well as Other
Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 177-83 (2010).
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alike. 44 Purposeful distinctions among similarly situated individuals will be
reviewed according to one of the three levels of scrutiny, strict,
intermediate, or rational basis, depending on the protected class to which
the individuals belong. Under strict scrutiny, a distinction must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.45 Under rational basis
review—also known as minimal scrutiny—a distinction need only be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.46
For a number of reasons, distinctions involving noncitizens have been
notoriously difficult to classify. First, distinctions based on citizenship
likely also involve at least one other factor, such as sex, race, or nationality.
Second, the applicable standard of scrutiny depends on who is conducting
the discrimination. State classifications that discriminate on the basis of
alienage are subject to strict scrutiny because noncitizens have been held to
be a “suspect class” deserving of heightened judicial protection.47 Federal
classifications related to alienage, however, receive only rational basis
review as a result of the plenary power doctrine and immigration
exceptionalism discussed in Section I.A. 48
II. Development of the Problem: 212(c) and 212(h) Waivers
Section 212(c) and 212(h) waivers have a seemingly simple function: to
“forgive” violations of the immigration laws so that a noncitizen can get or
retain legal status in the United States. Despite this apparent simplicity,
legal eligibility for the two waivers has been the subject of extensive
litigation. One particularly important question has been the expansion of the
two waivers to grounds of deportability as well as inadmissibility. Section
II.A will lay the groundwork for a discussion of the application of
“ordinary” administrative and constitutional principles in this body of case
law. It will introduce the place of these two waivers within the overall
structure of immigration law as well as the basic legal requirements for
each waiver. The remaining Sections, II.B through II.D, will trace the
history of the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h), paying particular attention to
the courts’ invocation and application of Chevron deference, arbitrary and
capricious review, and rational basis equal protection review.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976).
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A. Introduction to 212(c) and 212(h) Waivers
The current procedural structure of immigration law in the United States
is largely a product of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 49 Under this current system,
noncitizens may have difficulty obtaining or keeping legal status because of
problems with inadmissibility under section 212 of the INA or with
deportability under INA section 237. The deportability provisions of INA
section 237(a) apply to noncitizens who have already been legally inspected
and admitted into the United States. 50 The inadmissibility provisions of
INA section 212(a) apply under certain specified circumstances: LPRs
seeking admission who have particular types of criminal convictions or
meet other narrowly defined exceptions; all other noncitizens seeking
admission into the United States; noncitizens inside the United States who
were paroled in, entered as crewmen, or entered without inspection; and
noncitizens inside the United States who are applying for adjustment of
status or other immigration benefits that specify admissibility as an element
of the relief sought. 51 Questions of inadmissibility and deportability are
typically decided in a single set of proceedings, called removal
proceedings. 52
The structure of immigration law prior to 1996 had one particularly
significant parallel to the post-IIRIRA system: the concepts of excludability
and deportability, which mirror the current inadmissibility and deportability
sections of the INA. 53 Noncitizens seeking entry or admission into the
United States have consistently been treated differently than those who are
already here. 54 Before 1996, however, excludability and deportability were
49. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (making substantial changes to both
the substance and procedure of U.S. immigration law).
50. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (applying to “[a]ny alien . . . in and
admitted to the United States"); INA § 101(a)(13)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(a) (2012)
(defining “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer”).
51. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (rendering noncitizens within the specified
grounds of inadmissibility “ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the
United States”); INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012).
52. See INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2012).
53. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-46 (2011).
54. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also, e.g.,
Rosenbloom, supra note 12, 1983-84; Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention
of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933,
936-38, 948 (1995).
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decided in two separate types of proceedings, and those who were subject
to each type were defined differently than is the case today. 55 Both before
and after 1996, the grounds of excludability/inadmissibility and
deportability have changed and expanded over time. 56
Section 212 of the INA—both before and after IIRIRA’s 1996
revisions—also contains waivers in addition to specifying grounds of
inadmissibility. These waivers allow certain grounds of inadmissibility to
be “forgiven” under specified circumstances so that noncitizen applicants
may enter the United States or obtain a legal status that they would be
otherwise eligible for but for the ground of inadmissibility being waived.
Among these waivers are those under the former INA section 212(c) and
the current INA section 212(h). Sections 212(c) and 212(h) are both
frequently used to waive criminal convictions for long-term LPRs so that
such LPRs do not lose their status and may remain legally in the United
States. Section 212(c) may be used to waive most types of criminal
convictions, 57 while the scope of 212(h) is more limited. Section 212(h)
covers only inadmissibility resulting from crimes involving moral turpitude,
multiple criminal convictions, prostitution and commercialized vice, and
possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana. 58
1. INA Section 212(c)
Congress enacted section 212(c) of the INA in 1952 to replace a similar
waiver known as the Seventh Proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of
1917. 59 In order to qualify for relief under section 212(c), a noncitizen must
be lawfully admitted for permanent residence and have maintained a lawful
domicile in the United States for the seven years immediately preceding the

55. See Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45-46.
56. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 94-96 (2nd Cir. 2007); see also 1 CHARLES
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.04 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.
2016).
57. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (amended 1996); 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56,
§ 74.04(1)(a).
58. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (“The Attorney General may, in his
discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection
(a)(2) of this section and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a
single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana . . . .”); see also INA §
212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2012).
59. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat.
163, 187 (1952) (originally passed as the McCarran-Walter Bill of 1952); Pub. L. No. 64301, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (1917); 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(1)(a).
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application for relief. 60 Certain grounds of inadmissibility related to
national security and international child abduction will make a noncitizen
ineligible.61
After demonstrating basic eligibility, the noncitizen must demonstrate
that the positive discretionary factors present in his or her individual case
outweigh the negative in order to show that he or she merits relief in an
exercise of the immigration judge’s discretion.62 Positive factors that an
immigration judge should consider include
family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in
this country (particularly when the inception of residence
occurred while the respondent was of young age), evidence of
hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs,
service in the country’s Armed Forces, a history of employment,
the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and
service to the community, proof of a genuine rehabilitation if a
criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to a
respondent’s good character. 63
Potentially adverse factors, on the other hand, are
the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground
at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this
country’s immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record
and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness, and the presence
of other evidence indicative of a respondent’s bad character or
undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. 64
The adjudicator must explicitly weigh these factors in his or her decision
granting or denying relief. 65
Section 212(c) remained a part of the INA from its enactment in 1952
until IIRIRA repealed it, effective April 1, 1997. 66 Despite the fact that
212(c) is not part of the current statute, the question of eligibility for
waivers under the former section 212(c) remains far from a moot point. The
60. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (amended 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f) (2016).
61. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (amended 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(3) (2016).
62. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582-83, 584 (BIA 1978).
63. Id. at 584-85.
64. Id. at 584.
65. Id. at 585.
66. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996) (replacing 212(c) by cancellation of
removal under INA section 240A(a)).
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Supreme Court held in INS v. St. Cyr that applying the repeal of 212(c) to
criminal issues that pre-dated IIRIRA could have an impermissibly
retroactive effect. 67 That is, 212(c) waivers must remain available to certain
noncitizens who would have been eligible for them at the time of the
criminal issues that rendered them removable. 68 The exact meaning and
application of the holding in St. Cyr was challenged repeatedly before the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“the Board” or “BIA”) and the circuit
courts of appeals, but the totality of this history is not relevant here.69 To
summarize, the current result of this litigation is that 212(c) can be used
today to waive all convictions occurring prior to April 1, 1997, if the
noncitizen meets the requirements of 212(c) as amended at the time of the
plea or conviction. 70
2. INA Section 212(h)
Section 212(h) of the INA was first created in 1957. 71 The current
version of the waiver was not enacted until 1996, as part of the same statute
that repealed the former INA 212(c).72 There are three different categories
of noncitizens who qualify for relief under the current version of section
212(h): (1) noncitizens whose criminal convictions occurred more than
fifteen years before their application for admission, are rehabilitated, and

67. 533 U.S. 289, 314-326 (2001).
68. Id. at 326.
69. See Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6-15 (2013), for more discussion of this history.
70. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(4) (2016) (stating 212(c) waives all aggravated felony
convictions prior to November 29, 1990, but conviction for an aggravated felony or
aggravated felonies between November 29, 1990, and April 24, 1996, will bar relief if the
noncitizen served an aggregate term of imprisonment of five years or more for those
convictions); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h) (2016) (explaining the impact of amendments made to
212(c) in 1996); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 (explaining the impact of amendments made to
212(c) in 1990 and 1996); Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 268-69 (BIA 2014)
(clarifying that 212(c) is available to noncitizens convicted after trial as well as through plea
agreement). For an illustration of the complexity of determining whether a noncitizen
qualified for 212(c) at the time of her conviction, see Maria Baldini-Potermin, CHART:
Eligibility for a 212(c) Waiver After Judulang and St. Cyr, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT,
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/cd_pa_Chart_
on_212c_After_Judulang.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
71. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85–316, § 5, 71 Stat. 639, 640 (codified at INA §
212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012)).
72. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 348, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (1996); see 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56,
§ 63.03(11)(f)(i).
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pose no danger to the national welfare, safety, and security of the United
States; (2) noncitizens who can demonstrate extreme hardship to a spouse,
parent, son or daughter that is an LPR or a United States citizen; or (3) selfpetitioners under the Violence Against Women Act. 73 A noncitizen
admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident is barred from
relief under all three categories if he or she has a conviction for an
aggravated felony or has not lawfully resided in the United States for seven
years prior to the initiation of removal proceedings. 74
Like 212(c), a 212(h) waiver is ultimately discretionary. 75 The
adjudicator must balance the same positive and adverse factors previously
discussed to decide whether an eligible noncitizen merits an exercise of
relief in the court’s discretion. 76 For applicants under the second subsection
discussed above who must demonstrate extreme hardship to a qualifying
relative, there is a substantial similarity in the factors to be considered for
hardship and for discretion, and in practice these two distinct portions of the
required analysis are often collapsed together. 77
3. Expansion
These basics of statutory eligibility are only the beginning of the story
for both 212(c) and 212(h). 78 By the language alone of these waivers, they
apply only to noncitizens seeking admission into the United States or
otherwise subject to the grounds of inadmissibility as set forth in Section
II.A. Both 212(c) and 212(h) waivers, however, have been the subject of
extensive litigation seeking to extend their reach. One focus of these
challenges has been to extend the applicability of the waivers to the
criminal grounds of deportability in addition to those of inadmissibility.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

INA § 212(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1) (2012).
INA § 212(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2) (2012).
Matter of Mendez-Morales, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 299-300 (BIA 1996).
Id. at 299-300 (citing Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978)).
See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 565–66 (BIA 1999); 5
GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 63.12(2)(a)(iii)(B), (iv); Gerald P. Seipp, Waivers of
Inadmissibility–From Basic Principles to Advanced Practice Considerations (Part 2), 03-09
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, at text accompanying note 27 (West 2003).
78. Today neither 212(c) nor 212(h) can be understood without reference to the wideranging and sometimes conflicting case law that has interpreted and expanded the statutory
provisions. Section 212(c), in particular, has been described as “one of the most complex
and frequently litigated areas of immigration law.” 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56,
§ 74.04(2)(a). This article does not (and could not) encompass the entirety of that judicial
history, but instead focuses on the particular aspect of it identified in this paragraph: the
availability of the waivers when a noncitizen is charged as deportable rather than
inadmissible.
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The results of this litigation can be summarized, in a somewhat
oversimplified sense, as follows: 212(c) can be used as a stand-alone waiver
to waive both inadmissibility and deportability while 212(h) as a standalone waiver will waive only grounds of inadmissibility. To demonstrate
how the courts could have reached such radically divergent outcomes in
seemingly substantially similar situations, the remaining sections in this
part will trace the development of the case law in each of the two different
areas. Sections II.B and II.C will focus on 212(c); Section II.B will cover
the initial application of 212(c) to the context of deportability; and Section
II.C will answer the question of which grounds of deportability 212(c) can
waive. Section II.D will address the significantly shorter history of the
failed expansion of 212(h). Throughout, I will focus in particular on the
invocation of ordinary administrative and constitutional law doctrines and
on the rationale used by the various courts within these frameworks to reach
such different conclusions.
B. Expansion of 212(c) Waivers to Deportability: The Basics
Questions of the applicability of and eligibility for relief under 212(c)
were actively contested and litigated over the forty-plus years that the
section was part of the INA. 79 The uncertainties and legal challenges have
only multiplied during the fifteen-plus years since its repeal.80 As covered
here in Section II.B, the basic issue of the expanded applicability of 212(c)
to charges of deportability was effectively resolved long before the repeal
of the subsection. 81 As will be discussed in Section II.C, however, related
questions continue to be litigated even today. Most recently and
significantly, these cases have been related to the Supreme Court’s
consideration in Judulang v. Holder of the standard for determining exactly
which offenses or grounds of deportability may be waived for noncitizens
charged as deportable.82

79. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-47 (2011); Glen, supra note 69, at 7-12; 7
GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(2).
80. For example, the issue of whether noncitizens convicted after a jury trial instead of
by plea remain eligible for 212(c) waivers remained unresolved until the Supreme Court
issued their opinion in Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012). See also Matter of
Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 268-69 (BIA 2014). The question of which criminal
convictions are waivable continued to be litigated up through the Supreme Court’s decision
in Judulang, 565 U.S. 42. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(2)(f), (4).
81. See generally Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Silva, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976).
82. 565 U.S. 42.
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1. Slow Growth
The BIA recognized the expanded applicability of the former INA
section 212(c) gradually through a series of incremental decisions.83 First,
the Board recognized the ability of noncitizens charged as deportable to
apply for a 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility nunc pro tunc. 84 This holding
did not benefit all noncitizens in deportation proceedings but only a
subgroup: noncitizens who took a temporary and voluntary trip abroad after
the criminal conviction that rendered them inadmissible and deportable and
who qualified for a 212(c) waiver at the time of their reentry into the United
States from that trip. 85 Nunc pro tunc means literally “now for then.”86
These noncitizens were granted a 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility back to
the time of their reentry, as though they had been apprehended and placed
in exclusion proceedings at that time instead of being placed in deportation
proceedings later.
The Board’s decisions relied primarily on the fact that the Seventh
Proviso, the previously discussed predecessor to 212(c), had been available
under these circumstances.87 Since Congress was well aware of this fact
and did not act to change it while intentionally modifying other aspects of
212(c), the Board held that Congress must have intended for 212(c) to
remain available nunc pro tunc in deportation proceedings. 88 The Board’s
discussion in the 212(c) cases did not go beyond this. The decisions do not
reference any equal protection concerns or discuss equal protection
explicitly in any way. The Attorney General’s earlier Seventh Proviso case
that was cited in the 212(c) cases—while not overtly raising equal
protection or administrative law—did examine factors that would likely
arise in an equal protection analysis and use language sounding similar to
arbitrary and capricious review. 89 The Attorney General recognized that
“[n]ot what the alien has done but the fact that he has taken a trip becomes
the operative fact that renders him excludable or deportable,” although he

83. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 270-71; 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 56, § 74.04(1)(a).
84. Matter of F-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 537, 537-34 (BIA 1955); Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec.
598, 599-600 (BIA 1954); Matter of S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 393-97 (BIA 1954); cf. Matter
of G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956).
85. F-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 538-39; M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. at 599-600; S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at
393-97.
86. Nunc pro tunc, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (Lexis Nexis, ed. 2010).
87. S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 393-96.
88. Id.
89. See Matter of L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 5-6 (A.G. 1940).
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did not explicitly label this fact problematic.90 He discussed the fact that not
allowing nunc pro tunc waivers of inadmissibility would mean that the
respondent was placed in a worse position by having been (erroneously)
readmitted without issue and determined,
I cannot conclude that Congress intended the immigration laws
to operate in so capricious and whimsical a fashion. Granted that
respondent’s departure in 1939 exposed him on return to the
peril of a fresh judgment as to whether he should be permitted to
reside in the United States, such judgment ought not to depend
upon the technical form of the proceedings. No policy of
Congress could possibly be served by such irrational result. 91
While not referencing the equal protection or constitutional framework, this
mirrors an exercise of rational basis review.
Another Seventh Proviso case, holding that noncitizens may apply for
and receive an advance grant of the 212(c) waiver prior to departure, went a
step further. 92 The Board noted that “a contrary view would result in
consequences both capricious and absurd” and held that a chance trip
abroad could not be allowed to determine an alien’s substantive eligibility
for relief and ability to remain in the United States.93 It is highly likely,
given the explicit reliance on the Seventh Proviso cases, that these same
concerns were underlying the Board’s decisions in the 212(c) nunc pro tunc
cases, even though the Board did not explicitly discuss them there.
Next, the Board extended the holding in the nunc pro tunc cases to allow
some noncitizens in deportation proceedings who had not departed the
United States subsequent to the criminal issue that made them inadmissible
to apply for a 212(c) waiver. So long as the noncitizen filed the waiver
application in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status, the
Board found the waiver would be available to those who qualify. 94 Here
again the Board was focused on not treating differently groups of
noncitizens who were, for all relevant intents and purposes, substantially
similarly situated.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Matter of A-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 459, 461-63 (BIA 1946).
Id. at 461.
Matter of Smith, 11 I. & N. Dec. 325, 327 (BIA 1965).
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These decisions appeared to culminate with the Board’s decision in a
1971 case, Matter of Arias-Uribe. 95 Here, the Board halted the expansion of
the applicability of 212(c) waivers in deportation proceedings, holding that
they were available only in the two scenarios previously discussed: nunc
pro tunc to a post-conviction trip abroad or in conjunction with an
application to adjust status. 96 Arias-Uribe had not departed the United
States after his conviction for possession of heroin and did not qualify for
adjustment of status, but he argued that Congress had tacitly approved an
administrative practice of allowing noncitizens like himself to nevertheless
use a 212(c) waiver to waive grounds of deportability. 97
The Board rejected this argument, relying almost exclusively on the
language of the statute itself to reach its conclusion. 98 Specifically, the
Board focused on the change in language from the Seventh Proviso, which
required that the noncitizen be “returning after a temporary absence,” to the
language in section 212(c), which required that the noncitizen have
“temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of
deportation.” 99 The Board then held that this shift in language indicated
Congress’ intention to curb the advance use of 212(c) waivers in
deportation proceedings by requiring (in most cases) an actual departure
and return to the country. 100 The Board did not discuss the implication of
the distinction this holding drew between noncitizens who happened to
travel outside the United States and those who did not, or reference equal
protection or factors relevant to an equal protection analysis in any way.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding in
a brief decision without substantial discussion, stating simply that allowing
the use of 212(c) to waive grounds of deportability violated the clear
language of the statute.101
2. Francis, Silva, and Onward
Matter of Arias-Uribe proved, however, to be only a temporary pause.
The expansion of the availability of 212(c) to waive grounds of
deportability was restarted by a case decided by the Second Circuit Court of
95.
1972).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (BIA 1971), aff’d Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir.
Id. at 697-99.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 699-700, 699 n.2; see also Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1976).
Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 699-700; see also Francis, 532 F.2d at 271.
Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Appeals, Francis v. INS. 102 In Francis, the Second Circuit agreed that the
Board’s interpretation in Arias-Uribe was consistent with the statutory
language of section 212(c). 103 Francis argued, however, and the Second
Circuit agreed, that this interpretation deprived him of the equal protection
of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 104
The Second Circuit began by affirming that, despite Congress’ and the
Executive’s plenary power over immigration, the government must abide
by the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections in the area of
immigration, and that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws applies
to noncitizens in deportation proceedings. 105 The court applied the minimal
scrutiny test, which it explained required that “distinctions between
different classes of persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.” 106 Ultimately, the court held that the government had offered
no rational basis to treat lawful permanent residents who had never
temporarily departed the country after a criminal conviction less favorably
than those who had. No reason was offered to explain why travel should be
a crucial factor, but even if it were, logic and fairness could not support the
Board’s interpretation prohibiting a noncitizen “whose ties with this
country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry” from
even applying for 212(c) relief while allowing applications from “an
individual who may leave and return from time to time.”107 The court
concluded by stating, “Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent
resident aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and
fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner.” 108
Deference was not addressed in Francis. Francis 109 was decided nearly a
decade prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron 110 and Cardoza102. 532 F.2d 268.
103. Id. at 271-72.
104. Id. at 272-73.
105. Id. at 272 (first citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); then citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); and then citing Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2nd Cir.
1975)).
106. Id. (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
107. Id. at 273.
108. Id.
109. 532 F.2d 268.
110. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Fonseca. 111 The Second Circuit in deciding Francis, therefore, did not go
through a step-by-step analysis to determine whether Congress had spoken
clearly and, if not, if the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. In fact,
beyond agreeing that the Board’s interpretation in Arias-Uribe was
consistent with the statutory language, the court in Francis did not raise
deferring to the Board’s position in Arias-Uribe at all, in word or in
action. 112
The Board subsequently adopted the Second Circuit’s position in Matter
of Silva. 113 After tracing the history of the expansion of 212(c) relief and its
own prior inconsistent decision in Arias-Uribe, the Board wholeheartedly
adopted the Second Circuit’s holding and rationale from Francis without
offering any additional reasoning or analysis of its own. 114 Since Silva, the
basic premise that noncitizens charged with deportability may be eligible
for 212(c) waivers has been widely applied and essentially uncontested
throughout the United States. 115 Questions of precisely how this expanded
applicability would be determined and applied in individual cases moving
forward, however, remained unresolved.
C. Expansion of 212(c) Waivers to Deportability: Which Grounds?
One significant and controversial question that remained following
Francis and Silva was what it meant for lawful permanent residents to be
“similarly situated” and therefore prima facie eligible for relief under
212(c). That is, since the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability are
not identical,116 exactly what grounds of deportability or what criminal
convictions may be waived under 212(c)? 117 This question arose primarily
111. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
112. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 271-73.
113. 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976).
114. Id. at 29-30 (“In light of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the law, it is our position that no distinction shall be made between permanent
resident aliens who temporarily proceed abroad and nondeparting permanent resident aliens.
We further conclude that permanent resident aliens similarly situated shall be treated equally
with respect to their applications for discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Act.”).
115. See, e.g., De Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1993); Butros v. INS,
990 F.2d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 1993); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949 (7th Cir.
1993); Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 105, 106 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993); Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d
631, 633 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 313 (1st Cir.1992);
Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325, 328 n.3 (10th Cir. 1977).
116. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-46 (2011).
117. See, e.g., Sara Fawk, Note, Immigration Law - Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief
from Deportation: Is It the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 417 (2010); Michael M. Waits, Note, “In Like Circumstances but for
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in three different groups of cases. The first group involved charges of being
present in the United States after entering without inspection118—that is, a
charge of deportability that could not logically be a ground of
inadmissibility. The second group involved noncitizens convicted of
firearm-related offenses. 119 The third group consisted of noncitizens
convicted of aggravated felonies.120 Unlike the charges of deportability in
the first group, Congress could have chosen to make firearm offenses and
aggravated felonies grounds of excludability. Instead, Congress made them
grounds of deportability but not inadmissibility. Some convictions that
constitute aggravated felonies would also trigger one of the criminal
grounds of inadmissibility, while most convictions that are firearm offenses
would not.

Irrelevant and Fortuitous Factors”: The Availability of Section 212(c) Relief to Deportable
Legal Permanent Residents, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 465 (2009).
118. See INA § 241(a)(1)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(ii) (amended and transferred
1996) (making being present in the United States after having entered without inspection a
ground of deportability). Today entry without inspection is a ground of inadmissibility, not a
ground of deportability. See INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012). This is a
result of IIRIRA’s shift from a focus on physical entry to a requirement of lawful inspection
and admission as the dividing line between exclusion/inadmissibilty and deportability. See
INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13)(A)(2012); Kate Aschenbrenner, Beyond
“Because I Said So”: Reconciling Civil Retroactivity Analysis in Immigration Cases with a
Protective Lenity Principle, 32 REV. LITIG. 147, 169-70 (2013).
119. See INA § 237(a)(2)(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(c) (2012) (making certain firearm
offenses a ground of deportability).
120. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies). There
is no definitive answer as to what caused this marked shift in the grounds of deportability for
which noncitizens sought relief under the former 212(c), but at least part of the answer likely
stems from changes made to immigration law by IIRIRA in 1996. Aggravated felonies
became a ground of deportability in 1988, but at that time there were very few of them. See
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295-96 n.4 (2001). In 1996, IIRIRA radically expanded the
definition of aggravated felonies and specifically stated that the expansion was retroactive.
See id. This meant that post-1996 someone could be deportable as an aggravated felon for a
criminal conviction that occurred prior to 1996, making it more likely for the question of the
expanded applicability of 212(c) to charges of deportability for these convictions to arise.
Furthermore, IIRIRA also created a new remedy for LPRs with criminal convictions:
cancellation of removal, which barred those with aggravated felony convictions but was a
more attractive option for relief from removal for those charged with other grounds of
removability. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). After St. Cyr clarified the
continued availability of 212(c) relief in 2001, then, increasing numbers of noncitizens with
what now constituted aggravated felony convictions were potentially in need of 212(c) relief
while decreasing numbers of noncitizens with other types of convictions needed to rely on
212(c).
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Section II.C.1 below will discuss how the BIA and the circuit courts of
appeals answered the question of what it means for an LPR charged as
deportable to be similarly situated prior to the repeal of section 212(c) in
1996. These cases fall within group one, those charged with entry without
inspection, and group two, those charged with firearms offenses. Section
II.C.2 will consider how the question was answered after 2001, when the
Supreme Court held that denying 212(c) relief for criminal convictions
occurring prior to its repeal could be impermissibly retroactive.121 These
cases fall within group three, noncitizens charged as deportable for
aggravated felony convictions. The Supreme Court finally weighed in on
this question in 2011 in Judulang v. Holder. Section II.C.3 will address the
Judulang case and its aftermath and application.
1. Pre-Repeal
a) The Board
Following its decision in Silva extending eligibility for 212(c) relief to
LPRs charged as deportable, the Board quickly confronted the question of
what it meant for such an LPR to be similarly situated. The Board held in a
number of cases that “if a ground of deportation is also a ground of
inadmissibility,” the ground of deportation is waivable under 212(c). 122
This standard became known as the comparable-grounds analysis. 123
However, what this term meant in application—and therefore what exactly
212(c) could waive for a noncitizen charged as deportable—was not so
quickly resolved. For example, must the grounds of deportation and
inadmissibility have identical language or can they differ slightly? How
much? Or what if there is no similar ground of inadmissibility with
corresponding language, but the conduct or conviction charged would
trigger another ground of inadmissibility? Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 124
decided by the Attorney General in 1991, appears to be considered by the
circuit courts of appeals as the agency’s authoritative position on this
issue. 125
121. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314-26.
122. Matter of Salmon, 16 I. & N. Dec. 734, 737 (BIA 1978); see also, e.g., Matter of
Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (BIA 1984); Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728
(BIA 1979).
123. See, e.g., Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).
124. 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991) aff'd, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished table decision).
125. See, e.g., De La Rosa v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1332, 1336 (11th Cir.
2009); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Abebe v. Gonzales
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Joel Hernandez-Casillas was an LPR. He was apprehended and charged
as deportable for entering without inspection following his entry into the
United States by wading across the Rio Grande while assisting a group of
undocumented individuals to enter for a fee. 126 He attempted to apply for
relief under INA 212(c) even though he was placed in deportation, not
exclusion, proceedings, but the immigration judge denied his application. 127
The immigration judge held that 212(c) was unavailable to noncitizens
charged as deportable for entering without inspection. 128
The Board first decided Matter of Hernandez-Casillas in 1990. 129 The
Board reversed the immigration judge, holding that “the same fundamental
fairness/equal protection arguments made in Francis v. INS can and should
be invoked to make section 212(c) relief available to aliens deportable
under any ground of deportability.” 130 The Board relied heavily on the fact
that the current application of 212(c) had already departed significantly
from the original statutory language and intentions and that traditional tools
of statutory interpretation were of little utility. 131 In that light, it found that
its approach was the cleanest and simplest logical alternative and would
have “the benefit of alleviating potential hardships to sometimes deserving
aliens.” 132 The Board backed away from its previous cases requiring a
“comparable ground” of excludability and essentially interpreted the
“similarly situated” language from Francis and Silva in its broadest
possible sense. 133
Had the Board’s decision stood, it likely would have substantially ended
litigation on this particular question. In 1991, however, the Attorney
(Abebe I), 493 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir.
2007); Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales,
483 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 368-70 (5th Cir. 2007);
Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2001); Rodriguez-Padron
v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939,
949 (7th Cir. 1993).
126. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 263.
127. Id. at 263-64.
128. Id. at 264.
129. Id. at 262.
130. Id. at 266 (citation omitted) (excluding only grounds of deportability “where there is
a comparable ground of exclusion which has been specifically excepted from section
212(c),” relating to “subversives and war criminals”).
131. Id. at 265 (“In deciding to change our approach to section 212(c) waivers, we have
considered that section 212(c) as currently applied bears little resemblance to the statute as
written.”).
132. Id. at 268-69.
133. See id.
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General certified the case to himself and reversed the Board. 134 The
Attorney General was very critical of the Board’s “unjustified expansion of
discretionary relief under section 212(c).”135 He declined to reconsider the
Board’s decision in Silva, but seemed to encourage the Board to do so in a
future case. 136 He found no equal protection violation137 and no other reason
to depart further from the statutory text of 212(c) and therefore held that
Hernandez-Casillas was ineligible for relief under 212(c).138
The Attorney General’s decision returned to the principle that 212(c) was
unavailable to noncitizens in deportation proceedings charged with a
ground of deportability for which there was no comparable or analogous
ground of inadmissibility. 139 The fact that the Board had previously reached
a similar, although narrower, conclusion in a case within the second group,
involving a firearm offense, further supported this principle. In Matter of
Granados, the Board held that the respondent was ineligible for relief under
212(c) because his firearms offense did not come within the grounds of
excludability waivable by 212(c): “Conviction for possession of a
concealed sawed-off shotgun is not a specified section 212(a) ground of
excludability, nor a crime involving moral turpitude that would render the
respondent excludable under section 212(a)(9) of the Act.”140 The terms
“analogous” and “comparable,” however, were never clearly defined and

134. Id. at 280-81. The Attorney General has the power to certify Board decisions to him
or herself for decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2016). The Attorney General’s decision
will then become the final agency determination in the case and binding precedent in future
cases. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2016).
135. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 289.
136. Id. at 286; see also, e.g., Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 896 (2nd Cir. 1993).
137. Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 287-89 (“Under no plausible understanding
of equal protection principles must discretionary relief be made available in deportation
cases where the ground for deportation could not be waived if asserted in an exclusion
case—or, as here, could not be asserted at all in an exclusion case.”).
138. Id. at 293. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Attorney
General’s decision without opinion. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.
1993).
139. See, e.g., De La Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1332, 1336 (11th Cir.
2009); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Vue v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2007); Abebe I, 493 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007); Dalombo
Fontes v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 36870 (5th Cir. 2007); Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2001);
Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994); Leal-Rodriguez v.
INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949-50 (7th Cir. 1993); Matter of Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 771 (BIA
2005); Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 2005).
140. 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (BIA 1979).
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the BIA and federal courts continued to issue decisions debating their
meaning and reaching different conclusions.
b) The Circuit Courts
The circuit courts of appeals also grappled with the same question of
what grounds of deportability could be waived by 212(c). These cases were
initially concentrated in the first two groups: charges of deportability for
entering without inspection and for firearm offenses. While cases involving
entry without inspection might seem to present a more straightforward
question, as entry without inspection under the version of the statute then in
effect could not logically be a ground of deportability, in practice this did
not prove to be the case. The courts hearing these cases took a variety of
approaches and reached results different in several respects from the
Attorney General’s holding in Hernandez-Casillas. The firearm offense
cases, on the other hand, primarily reached the same conclusion as the BIA
in Granados, albeit by several varying routes.
(1) Group One: Entry Without Inspection
The circuits split in major cases addressing entry without inspection. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez v. INS sided
with the Attorney General in Hernandez-Casillas, finding that 212(c) could
not waive deportability for entry without inspection. 141 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia v. INS held the
opposite, finding that, for the sake of “coherence and consistency,” 212(c)
relief must be available to noncitizens charged as deportable for entering
without inspection. 142 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
perhaps most interestingly, found 212(c) available to waive entry without
inspection in some cases but not in others. 143 In Marti-Xiques v. INS, the
Eleventh Circuit found that entry without inspection could be waived by
section 212(c) where the noncitizen was also charged with some other,
more serious, ground of deportability arising out of the same incident that

141. 990 F.2d 939, 950 (7th Cir. 1993).
142. 6 F.3d 891, 897 (2nd Cir. 1993).
143. Compare Marti-Xiques v. INS, 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on
rehearing 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th
Cir. 1984) with Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). Despite the
fact that Farquharson was decided after the repeal of 212(c) in 1996, it deals with an order
to show cause issued by INS in 1986 and therefore pre-1996 procedures and law govern the
case on the questions relevant here. See Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1319, 1320 n.3.
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did have a comparable ground in the grounds of inadmissibility. 144 In
Farquharson v. United States Attorney General, without so much as even
citing to Marti-Xiques, the Eleventh Circuit held that 212(c) was not
available to waive entry without inspection even where the respondent was
also charged with deportability for a controlled substance violation, an
arguably more serious ground of deportability, arising out of the same
incident.145
In addition to reaching these different substantive results, the courts took
varying routes to get there, particularly with respect to their invocation of
Chevron deference and reliance on equal protection arguments. The
Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez cited to Chevron and discussed Chevron
deference at some length before reaching the same result as the BIA. 146
Most of the discussion regarding Chevron, however, took place in the
context of another issue in Leal-Rodriguez: whether Leal-Rodriguez’s
actions in fact constituted an entry and therefore made him removable as
charged for entering without inspection.147 When it reached its discussion
of whether or not 212(c) was available to waive a charge of entering
without inspection, the court simply referred back to its earlier discussion
and stated, “we must defer to the Attorney General’s interpretation if it is
reasonable.” 148 The court cited to both the Supreme Court’s decision in

144. 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on rehearing, 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir.
1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984). On rehearing, the Eleventh
Circuit found that Marti-Xiques had not met one of the requirements, seven years of lawful
domicile, to obtain relief under 212(c). Marti-Xiques, 741 F.2d at 355.
145. 246 F.3d at 1325. The court in Farquharson may have felt itself not bound by the
prior panel’s decision in Marti-Xiques because that panel decision was vacated and decided
on other grounds. Given the similarity in circumstances, however, it is somewhat surprising
that the Farquharson court did not at least briefly acknowledge Marti-Xiques, even if it did
not go so far as to explain or justify why it was reaching a different result. This is
particularly true where the BIA and at least two other circuit courts of appeals discussed and
seemingly took very seriously the Eleventh Circuit’s initial panel decision in Marti-Xiques.
See Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1993); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321,
1326-27 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), 554 F.3d 1203 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 26769 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991) aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.
1993) (unpublished table decision). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit itself discussed the original
panel decision in Marti-Xiques in a firearm offense case, discussed below. See RodriguezPadron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1458 (11th Cir. 1994).
146. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 944-46, 950-52 (7th Cir. 1993).
147. Id. at 944-46.
148. Id. at 950.
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Chevron 149 and another Seventh Circuit decision150 following this
statement. 151
Leal-Rodriguez argued that the Attorney General’s decision in
Hernandez-Casillas was unreasonable for three different reasons: that the
language of 212(c) itself supports the extension of its relief to all deportable
aliens, that the 1990 amendments to the INA support this interpretation and
demonstrate that Congress intended it, and that the position announced in
Hernandez-Casillas violated his right to equal protection under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 152
After considering and dismissing each of these three arguments, the
Seventh Circuit found the agency’s position as announced in HernandezCasillas reasonable and upheld it, dismissing Leal-Rodriguez’s appeal. 153
A problem with this analysis is that it completely skips two questions:
whether Chevron applies in the first instance and whether Congress spoke
clearly on the issue in question. The prior Seventh Circuit decision cited 154
and the decision it cites 155 both repeat this same error, considering only
whether the agency’s position on two separate, unrelated legal questions
was reasonable. Although the court in Leal-Rodriguez identified these two
questions in its discussion of the legal standard, it ignored them in
application. 156 The Seventh Circuit may have assumed that, given the
somewhat tortured history of administrative and judicial modification it had
detailed, it was clear that Congress had not spoken clearly. 157 It did not,
however, state, much less explain, this presumption or its decision to apply
Chevron in the first instance.
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia did
not cite to or discuss Chevron, but did make an oblique reference to
deference in its preliminary statement of the standard of review. After
asserting that its review of questions of law was plenary, it qualified its
declaration by adding, “In conducting that review, however, deference must
149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
150. Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Chevron to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA in an asylum claim).
151. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 950-52 ("We therefore leave the Attorney General’s decision intact and hold
that section 212(c) relief is not available to Leal.”).
154. Zalega, 916 F.2d at 1259.
155. Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
156. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950-52.
157. Id. at 948-50.
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be accorded to the views of the Attorney General, who is charged with the
administration of the INA and whose rulings with respect to questions of
immigration law are controlling within the executive branch.” 158 In support
of this statement on deference, the Second Circuit cited two cases: the
Seventh Circuit’s Leal-Rodriguez case and its application of Chevron just
discussed, and a pre-Chevron Second Circuit case applying a standard that
differs, at least slightly, from the Chevron two-step test. 159
Despite discussing the Attorney General’s decision in HernandezCasillas at length, the Second Circuit did not explicitly raise deference in
its decision—perhaps because it did not in fact defer to that decision.160 It
did, however, state, “The ruling that we make today poses no challenge to
the legislative and executive branches, or to the Attorney General’s special
role within the executive branch with respect to legal interpretation of the
immigration statutes.” 161 The Second Circuit relied heavily on the fact that
the application of 212(c) had been judicially modified so far from the
original text that it did not make sense to ask what the statutory language
meant or what Congress intended.162 The court noted that what it was really
interpreting was its own prior constitutional decision in Francis, not a
statute over which the Attorney General had “conceded expertise.”163 The
Second Circuit may then have been holding, although they did not
explicitly state, that Chevron was inapplicable by its own terms because this
was not an instance of an agency interpreting a statute that it was charged to
administer.
The Eleventh Circuit decided Marti-Xiques 164 prior to the BIA’s decision
in Hernandez-Casillas and prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chevron, so there was no directly on-point BIA decision to defer to and
deference was not at issue. In Farquharson, the Eleventh Circuit, like the
Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia, referenced deference exclusively in its
158. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 893 (2nd Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 893-94 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988); Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950;
De los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56, 59 (2nd Cir. 1982)). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) simply sets
out the authority of the Attorney General. De los Santos describes the standard as follows:
“[I]f INS’s interpretation is reasonable, in that it is consistent with the statutory language,
legislative history, and purpose of the statute, we will not invalidate it.” 690 F.2d at 59.
160. Bedoya-Valencia, 6 F.3d at 895-96 (stating, regarding the Board’s decision in
Hernandez-Casillas, “We view the matter differently.”).
161. Id. at 898.
162. Id. at 897-98.
163. Id. at 898.
164. 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on rehearing, 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir.
1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984).
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preliminary statement of its standard of review. It stated: “In our review of
the BIA’s decision, we review the BIA’s statutory interpretation de novo,
but we defer to the BIA’s interpretation if it is reasonable.”165 In support of
this statement, it cited only to another Eleventh Circuit case.166 That case in
turn cited to a third Eleventh Circuit case without significant discussion of
the standard. 167 The third case finally cites to, discusses, and applies the
Chevron test. 168
The statement quoted above from Farquharson is not a complete
statement of the Chevron test, as it omitted the step-one analysis of whether
Congress has spoken clearly. However, it may simply be reciting stock
language rather than affirmatively misstating the standard. The third case
that finally cited Chevron, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, recited
this same stock phrase before correctly and completely expanding and
discussing the Chevron two-step test.169 On the other hand, the Eleventh
Circuit in Farquharson may have been repeating the Seventh Circuit’s
errors in Leal-Rodriguez by proceeding from a presumption that Chevron
does apply and step one has already been decided in the negative or
completely avoiding these preliminary questions.
Although the Eleventh Circuit discussed the Board’s decision in
Hernandez-Casillas, 170 noted the significant similarities with Farquharson’s
situation, 171 and ultimately decided the case in accordance with the
agency’s position, 172 it did not apply anything resembling the Chevron twostep test or even mention deference again in its analysis. The court focused
on answering the question whether denying noncitizens like Farquharson,
charged as deportable for entering without inspection, the opportunity to
apply for relief under 212(c) violated equal protection. 173 It did note that it
found convincing the Attorney General’s analysis on this issue.174
All three of the circuits in the cases considering entry without inspection
at least referenced equal protection, but none found an equal protection
violation. The Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia discussed equal
165. Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001).
166. Id. (citing Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d 614, 616 (11th Cir. 1994)).
167. Asencio, 37 F.3d at 616 (citing Perlera-Escobar v. Exec. Office for Immigration, 894
F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990)).
168. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1296-97.
169. See id. at 1296.
170. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1323-24.
171. Id. at 1324-25.
172. Id. at 1325-26.
173. Id. at 1325.
174. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/1

2017]

212(C) AND 212(H) WAIVERS

143

protection only in the context of describing its prior decision in Francis and
the Attorney General’s decision in Hernandez-Casillas, despite the fact that
the BIA decision it was reviewing had discussed equal protection and found
no violation.175 The Eleventh Circuit in Marti-Xiques referenced equal
protection only once, in stating the Second Circuit’s holding in Francis. 176
Neither the Second Circuit in Bedoya-Valencia nor the Eleventh Circuit in
Marti-Xiques explained why they were not addressing equal protection.
Only the Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez 177 and the Eleventh Circuit
in Farquharson 178 discussed equal protection arguments in more depth.
Leal-Rodriguez argued that his right to equal protection under the law was
violated when other noncitizens with much more serious criminal
convictions could apply for relief under the former section 212(c) while he
could not. 179 In Leal-Rodriguez, the court explained the standard for
determining equal protection violations as looking to whether there was a
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the enactment of the
immigration provision at issue.180 After stating this standard and explaining
Leal-Rodriguez’s arguments, however, the court did not even attempt to
apply it or refute respondent’s argument of an equal protection violation.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit focused on its desire not to further judicially
expand 212(c) beyond what was required by the rationale in Francis and
Silva and held that the reasons to interfere with congressional intent were
not sufficiently strong under the circumstances at issue.181 The court
referenced the plenary power doctrine, although not by name, and
expressed concern with meddling in Congress’ power to regulate
immigration. 182
The Eleventh Circuit in Farquharson expressed the standard somewhat
differently, evoking the minimal scrutiny test and stating, “A statutory
175. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 893, 895, 896-97 (2nd Cir. 1993).
176. Marti-Xiques v. INS, 713 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on rehearing,
724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1984), decided on other grounds, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984).
177. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1993).
178. 246 F.3d at 1324.
179. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 951.
180. Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)). The court relied on the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794, and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 770 (1972), for this standard. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 951.
181. Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 952 (“To hold that the same form of discretionary relief
must be available to aliens deportable for different, but arguably comparable, violations is to
interfere again, on an even weaker rationale, with Congress’s scheme for regulating
aliens.”).
182. Id. at 951-52.
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distinction such as that challenged by Farquharson . . . will survive an equal
protection challenge if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.” 183 Although not articulated identically,
this standard should, in practice, mean essentially the same thing as the
standard asserted by the Seventh Circuit in Leal-Rodriguez. 184 In
application, however, the Eleventh Circuit diverged from the Seventh. Like
the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned with further
judicially stretching the meaning of the plain language of 212(c). Unlike the
Seventh Circuit, however, the Eleventh Circuit looked for and found a
“rational” reason for distinguishing noncitizens deportable for entry without
inspection: “It is reasonable that the government would decline to offer a
waiver to aliens deportable for entry without inspection, since illegal entry
violations directly and fundamentally undermine the enforcement efforts of
the INS.” 185
(2) Group Two: Firearm Offenses
Unlike the cases involving entry without inspection, there was no circuit
split with respect to cases in the second group, those involving charges of
deportability based on firearm offenses. The circuit courts that considered
the question held that the firearms-related grounds of deportability had no
comparable ground of inadmissibility and that 212(c) was therefore not
available to waive them. The significant cases in this second group include
Cabasug v. INS 186 and Komarenko v. INS 187 in the Ninth Circuit, Campos v.
INS 188 in the First Circuit, Chow v. INS 189 and Rodriguez v. INS 190 in the
Fifth Circuit, Rodriguez-Padron v. INS 191 in the Eleventh Circuit, and
Gjonaj v. INS 192 in the Sixth Circuit. Despite reaching the same result, the
courts took significantly different paths to get there, including with respect
183. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1324 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
184. See, e.g., Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 316 (1st Cir. 1992) (connecting the two
standards and explaining the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” language as the
specific application of the minimal scrutiny test to an immigration law provision).
185. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1325.
186. 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (per curiam).
187. 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203.
188. 961 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992).
189. 12 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1993).
190. 9 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1993).
191. 13 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir. 1994).
192. 47 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 1995).
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to their invocation of Chevron deference and reliance on equal protection
arguments.
Only the Fifth Circuit in Chow and the Eleventh Circuit in RodriguezPadron specifically discussed Chevron deference. In Chow, as in the
Seventh Circuit’s Leal-Rodriguez decision discussed earlier,193 part of the
discussion regarding Chevron took place in the context of another
argument—whether Chow was in fact deportable as charged for a firearms
offense. 194 There the Fifth Circuit clearly recognized that whether the law
was ambiguous or unequivocal and whether the agency interpretation was
reasonable were both part of the Chevron analysis. 195 When the court in
Chow reached the availability of 212(c), however, they stated only, citing
Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca, “[B]ecause Congress has delegated the
administration of the statutory scheme to the INS, its interpretation is
entitled to strong deference.” 196 It therefore addressed whether or not
Chevron applied, but ignored the question of whether or not the law was
unambiguous and addressed only implicitly whether the agency’s
interpretation was reasonable.197 In support of its holding that 212(c) was
unavailable for firearm offenses, it offered only favorable reference to its
own memorandum opinion summarily affirming the Attorney General’s
decision in Hernandez-Casillas and to the First Circuit’s decision in
Campos, tacitly supporting the position that the agency’s interpretation in
the case below was reasonable. 198
A second published Fifth Circuit case, Rodriguez v. INS, considering the
availability of 212(c) for a charge of deportability for a firearms offense
was decided just one month later and with one of the same judges on the
panel. 199 Oddly enough, the court in Rodriguez neither considered Chevron
deference nor cited to its earlier decision in Chow. 200
193. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 944-46 (7th Cir. 1993).
194. Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1993).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 38 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished
table decision); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992)).
199. 9 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1993). Judge Garwood sat on the panel in both cases and wrote
the court’s decision in Rodriguez. Id.; Chow, 12 F.3d 34.
200. Rodriguez relies on equal protection as the basis for its decision, 9 F.3d at 414,
while Chow does not consider an equal protection argument. The Court in Rodriguez does
state that its “review of immigration decisions is extremely limited.” Id. at 410 (citing Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
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The Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez-Padron addressed Chevron deference
only briefly and only in the last paragraph of its opinion before the
conclusion—essentially as an afterthought. 201 The court held, relying only
on Chevron: “Finally, and significantly, we note that the Attorney General’s
reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme is entitled to deference.” 202
Skipping Chevron step one, the court then went on to find, without
discussion, that the agency’s interpretation in Hernandez-Casillas was
reasonable and did not misinterpret the statute.203
The First Circuit in Campos did not mention the Chevron test or
deference by name, but it did suggest a standard of review that amounted
functionally to some level of deference to the agency: “While this court is
not, of course, bound by the Attorney General’s opinion, we should
disregard it only if it misconstrues the law or the Constitution.” 204 The court
provided no citation for this statement. 205 Although the BIA’s decision in
Granados 206 was more arguably on point, the court here was apparently
referring to the Attorney General’s decision in Hernandez-Casillas 207 when
it spoke of the Attorney General’s opinion.208 Despite stating throughout its
decision that it was interpreting provisions of the INA—the statute the
relevant agency was charged with administering—it did not discuss why it
was not applying the Chevron two-step test. 209 The court in Campos
ultimately found that the Attorney General’s decision in HernandezCasillas did not misinterpret 212(c) or other amendments to the
immigration laws and, as discussed below, did not violate equal
protection. 210 Like many of the courts deciding these cases, the First Circuit
strongly resisted what it described as further judicial “tinkering” with a
statute already stretched beyond its literal meaning. 211

201. Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1994).
202. Id. at 1460 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984)).
203. Id. at 1460-61.
204. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 314 (1st Cir. 1992).
205. See id.
206. Matter of Granado, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726 (BIA 1979), abrogated by Matter of
Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182 (BIA 1984).
207. 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished table decision).
208. Campos, 961 F.2d at 314.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 313-17.
211. Id. at 315, 317.
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The Ninth Circuit in Cabasug 212 and Komarenko, 213 the Fifth Circuit in
Rodriguez, 214 and the Sixth Circuit in Gjonaj 215 did not cite to Chevron or
even so much as allude to deference to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute in the 212(c) context. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Cabasug made a
contrary assertion, focused on Congress’ power to regulate immigration,
alleging that the court decides “in accord with deference to the
legislature.” 216 The Ninth Circuit’s omission of any mention of Chevron in
Komarenko in the 212(c) context is particularly curious because it cites and
applies Chevron in another context, the agency’s interpretation of whether
Komarenko should be barred from asylum for commission of a particularly
serious crime. 217 Of course, as in the entry without inspection cases, these
courts could be simply proceeding from a presumption that Chevron does
not apply, but they do not so state or explain why they think Chevron is
inapplicable.
Only Rodriguez-Padron in the Eleventh Circuit addressed both Chevron
deference and equal protection,218 although as discussed above, the First
Circuit in Campos functionally deferred to the agency and based its
decision on equal protection.219 The Ninth Circuit in Cabasug and
Komarenko and the Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez raised only equal
protection. 220 The Ninth, First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits do not differ
from each other or the previously discussed entry without inspection cases
as to the proper legal standard for the equal protection claims, at least in so
far as the legal standard was discussed or is clear in the cases. The courts do
depart in their applications of this standard, however, before coming back
together to reach the same outcome.
The Ninth Circuit in Cabasug did not discuss the legal standard for
assessing an equal protection violation. In application, the court focused on
the same distinction at stake in Francis and Silva and ultimately held that
there was no group being treated differently because there was no
212. Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe II, 554 F.3d
1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam).
213. Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d
1203.
214. Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1993).
215. Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 1995).
216. 847 F.2d at 1326.
217. Komarenko, 35 F.3d at 435-36.
218. Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1458-59, 1460 (11th Cir. 1994).
219. See Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 313-17 (1st Cir. 1992).
220. Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1993); Komarenko, 35 F.3d at 435;
Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1325-26.
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“substantially identical” language in the grounds of exclusion: “By contrast
with narcotics and marijuana cases, there exists no class of persons alike in
carrying sawed-off shotguns or machine guns, and deportable or not
depending on the irrelevant circumstance of whether at some previous time
they took a temporary trip out of the country.” 221 The court also considered
whether Congress could treat specific criminal offenses differently without
violating equal protection and concluded not only that Congress could but
had expressed a particular concern with firearms offenses in a number of
different contexts. 222
Six years later, the Ninth Circuit in Komarenko used a different analysis
to reach the same result.223 The court in Komarenko began with the holding
reached in previous cases, allegedly including Cabasug, that “when the
basis upon which the INS seeks deportation is identical to a statutory
ground for exclusion for which discretionary relief would be available, the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process guarantee
requires that discretionary relief be accorded in the deportation context as
well.” 224 It then considered whether firearms offenses were sufficiently
“identical” to the ground of exclusion for crimes of moral turpitude to give
rise to an equal protection violation and concluded that they were not. 225
The Ninth Circuit rejected an offense-specific approach that would have
looked at whether the conviction that rendered the noncitizen deportable
would also render him or her excludable.226
Unlike the two Ninth Circuit cases, the First Circuit in Campos did
discuss at length the applicability and standard for equal protection
violations under the Fifth Amendment: “Under well-established principles,
a challenged statute that does not employ a suspect classification or
impinge upon fundamental rights must be upheld if it is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental purpose.”227 In the immigration context, a statute
is rationally related if “it is based upon a 'facially legitimate and bona fide
reason.'” 228 The court in Campos ultimately held that it was not irrational
for Congress “to treat different crimes differently.”229 Significantly, the
221. Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1325, 1326.
222. Id. at 1326-27.
223. See 35 F.3d 432.
224. Id. at 434 (quoting Gutierrez v. INS, 745 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1984)).
225. Id. at 434-35.
226. Id. at 435.
227. 961 F.2d 309, 315-16 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d
18, 23 (1st Cir. 1991)).
228. Id. at 316 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)).
229. Id.
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court appeared to focus primarily on the Attorney General’s decision in
Hernandez-Casillas, which it described as “administratively dispositive,” to
a lesser extent, on the Board’s decision in Campos below, and not at all on
the Board’s decision in Granados or similar cases.230 This explains, at least
in part, its more general focus on different types of crimes, like the Ninth
Circuit in Cabasug, rather than specifically on firearms offenses, like the
Ninth Circuit in Komarenko.
The Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez v. INS purported to address an even
broader contention, whether failing to allow all deportees to apply for a
212(c) waiver violated equal protection.231 The court set out the same legal
standard for equal protection violations as laid out by the First Circuit in
Campos. 232 Ultimately the court answered the question with reference back
to firearms, holding that facially valid reasons for treating firearms offenses
differently—a particular concern with this type of offender—existed. 233 The
court recognized that the distinctions were “confusing and arbitrary,” but
nevertheless found them constitutional. 234 By answering the question in this
way, the court avoided the larger question it initially articulated.
The Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez-Padron approached the equal
protection question similarly to the courts in Cabasug, Campos, and
Rodriguez. The court in Rodriguez-Padron identified the same legal
standard and again held that it was rational for Congress to treat different
crimes, and in particular firearms offenses, differently. 235
The Sixth Circuit in Gjonaj v. INS236 discussed neither Chevron
deference nor equal protection. Its consideration of the availability of
212(c) to waive a firearms ground of deportability was only a few sentences
long. 237 It simply cited to a number of the previously discussed opinions in
support of its conclusion that the availability of 212(c) to waive grounds of
deportability required a comparable ground of inadmissibility and firearms

230. Id. at 314.
231. 9 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1993). Rodriguez may have been attempting to distinguish
his case by framing the question in this way. As earlier discussed, a previous Fifth Circuit
case, Chow, did not discuss equal protection at all. See Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34 (5th Cir.
1993).
232. Rodriguez, 9 F.3d at 414. The Rodriguez court cites both Campos and Cabasug. Id.
233. Id. at 414.
234. Id.
235. 13 F.3d 1455, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1994).
236. 47 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 1995).
237. See id. at 827.
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offenses did not have one. 238 The court then “decline[d] to change this wellestablished rule.” 239
(3) Pre-Repeal: Preliminary Conclusions
While some of the pre-repeal decisions on the contours of the expanded
application of 212(c) referenced Congress’ power to regulate immigration
and cited to plenary power cases, the cases also applied ordinary
administrative and constitutional law principles. None questioned whether
these ordinary principles were applicable in the immigration realm, even in
this somewhat unusual context of the judicial expansion of statutory relief
that might have brought such questions into the foreground.
As detailed in Section II.C.2.b, however, the courts varied significantly
as to which administrative and constitutional law doctrines were invoked
and the level of detail at which they were discussed. Chevron or other forms
of deference to the agency’s decisions in particular received little analysis
and portions of the doctrine were frequently omitted from the opinion with
no discussion. These variations and omissions make patterns somewhat
difficult to discern in the early case law. However, several overarching
comments can be made.
First, although the majority of the circuit courts in both the group one
entry without inspection and the group two firearms offenses cases
ultimately agreed with the agency that 212(c) relief was not available, the
courts did not apply a very high level of deference in reaching these
conclusions. Even among those decisions that referenced deference and
purported to be applying it, courts undertook their own detailed analyses of
the question independently of the agency’s analysis and the factors that the
agency had considered.
Second, there were not careful distinctions made between the various
doctrines and steps of the doctrines; the courts’ analyses frequently
combined supposedly disparate principles. In particular, the equal
protection analysis was often collapsed into the Chevron step-two
reasonableness inquiry. That is, courts appeared to consider whether the
agency’s interpretation of the applicability of 212(c) was unreasonable
238. Id. (citing Rodriguez-Padron, 13 F.3d at 1459-61; Rodriguez, 9 F.3d at 412-13;
Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 948-51 (7th Cir. 1993); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309,
311-14 (1st Cir. 1992); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated
by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam); Matter of HernandezCasillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v.
INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision)).
239. Id.
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because it violated equal protection. Courts also merged the question of
Congress’ intent and the meaning of the statutory language (step one of the
Chevron analysis) with step two, whether the agency’s interpretation of that
language was reasonable. A number of courts also noted, however, how far
the application of 212(c) had departed from the statutory language. This
factor may have driven the collapse of the Chevron analysis into a single
step in this context.
No definitive ultimate conclusion or agreed upon application of the
various doctrines was reached in the pre-repeal 212(c) cases. At the same
time as the Board and circuit courts were struggling with the expanded
applicability of 212(c), Congress was gradually restricting 212(c)’s
availability. 240 Congress repealed the waiver as part of the IIRIRA 241 in
1996—before the questions of which grounds of deportability or criminal
offenses could be waived by section 212(c), or what standard should be
applied in making that determination, could be answered definitively.
2. Post-St. Cyr – Group Three: Aggravated Felonies
While the questions of the contours of the expanded application of
212(c) faded somewhat into the background for a period of time following
the repeal of 212(c), they resurged after the Supreme Court’s decision in St.
Cyr. 242 The Supreme Court in St. Cyr ruled that the repeal of the waiver had
an impermissible retroactive effect, and that the waiver must remain
available to at least some noncitizens who were previously eligible.243 The
Department of Homeland Security promulgated a final regulation meant to
implement St. Cyr in 2004. 244 Among other provisions, the final rule
provided that 212(c) was unavailable where “[t]he alien is deportable under
former section 241 of the Act or removable under section 237 of the Act on
a ground which does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212 of the
Act.” 245 Cases in the third group, involving charges of deportability based
on aggravated felonies, predominated in this post-regulation resurgence.
240. See, e.g., Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2008); Matter of
Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 256-57 (BIA 2014).
241. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
242. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
243. Id. at 314-26.
244. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2007); see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5)
(2005).
245. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2005). This provision was not in the proposed rule, but was
added pursuant to a commenter’s suggestion. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d at 97 (citing
Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens With Certain Criminal Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 69
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Relatively quickly after the regulations were issued in 2004, the BIA
held that the regulation’s term “statutory counterpart” and case law’s
“comparable ground” or “corresponding ground” all meant that similar
language must have been used to describe substantially equivalent
categories of offenses. 246 Most circuits to consider the question agreed with
the Board’s narrow interpretation, with the result that most noncitizens in
group three with aggravated felony convictions would not be eligible for
212(c) relief. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that a ground of
deportability had a statutory counterpart if the offense that made the
noncitizen deportable would also make him or her inadmissible. 247 The
Second Circuit’s position would have meant that a significantly larger
group of noncitizens in group three could qualify for a 212(c) waiver. Just
as in the pre-repeal cases, ordinary principles of administrative and
constitutional law were almost unquestioningly invoked, but the circuit
courts varied widely as to how they interpreted and applied the doctrines of
Chevron deference and equal protection. Even more significantly, the
Supreme Court weighed in on this question, and introduced the use of the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious review for the first time in this context
without significant discussion of why it chose to make this shift. 248
a) The Board – Matter of Blake and Matter of Brieva-Perez
In 2005, the BIA applied and clarified this rule in two published cases
decided just months apart: Matter of Blake249 and Matter of BrievaPerez. 250 The noncitizen respondents in both Blake and Brieva-Perez were
charged as deportable based on convictions for aggravated felonies—sexual
abuse of a minor in Blake 251 and a crime of violence in Brieva-Perez. 252 The
Board began by holding that the “statutory counterpart” phrase from the
regulations had the same meaning as and could be employed

Fed. Reg. 57, 826, 57,831-32 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212, and
1240)).
246. Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (BIA 2005), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88; Matter of Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 772 (BIA
2005), aff'd sub. nom. Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007).
247. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d at 104.
248. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
249. 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 2005).
250. 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA 2005).
251. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 722-23.
252. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 767.
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interchangeably with the previously used phrases “comparable ground” or
“corresponding ground” from its case law. 253
Conviction of an aggravated felony is a ground of deportability under
INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), but is not included by name within the
grounds of inadmissibility. Aggravated felonies are defined within the INA
and include at least twenty-one different categories of offenses. 254 The
Board held that whether a conviction for an aggravated felony had a
statutory counterpart within the grounds of inadmissibility must be
determined by looking at the specific aggravated felony charged. 255 That is,
the question was whether sexual abuse of a minor and crimes of violence
had inadmissibility statutory counterparts.256
The Board considered the argument that Blake’s and Brieva-Perez’s
aggravated felonies had comparable grounds of inadmissibility because
nearly all sexual abuse of a minor and crime of violence offenses would
also render a noncitizen inadmissible as a crime involving moral
turpitude. 257 Ultimately, however, it held against this position. The Board
announced a narrow, limiting rule for making this determination:
“[W]hether a ground of deportation or removal has a statutory counterpart
in the provisions for exclusion or inadmissibility turns on whether Congress
has employed similar language to describe substantially equivalent
categories of offenses.” 258 “Considerable overlap” between two different
categories, like that Blake and Brieva-Perez argued existed between
aggravated felony crimes of violence or sexual abuse of a minor and crimes
involving moral turpitude, was found to be insufficient. 259
The Board in both cases parsed precedent and the recently enacted
Department of Justice regulation in a relatively formalistic manner to reach
its conclusions without going into the background of how and why the
statutory counterpart rule was initially adopted or justifying its narrow
reading of the regulation. The Board’s rule meant that a noncitizen’s
253. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 727.
254. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). The actual number of individual
aggravated felonies is higher as each category may contain more than one aggravated felony.
For example, the Board in Blake determined that INA 101(a)(43)(A) contained three
separate aggravated felony offenses. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 727.
255. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 728; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 772.
256. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 727; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 772.
257. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 723; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 771-73.
258. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 728; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 771.
259. Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 728; Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 771 ("In Blake, we
found the mere overlap between 'sexual abuse of a minor' and some crimes involving moral
turpitude insufficient to demonstrate that the provisions were statutory counterparts.").
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eligibility for relief under the former section 212(c) could turn on the
charging decision made by an officer of the Department of Homeland
Security. 260 Virtually identically situated respondents, then, could end up
being treated very differently. The Board did not discuss the rationale
underlying such a rule or any reasoning behind imposing it. It did not
acknowledge, much less discuss, any equal protection implications of their
holding.
b) The Fifth Circuit – Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales
The Board’s decision in Brieva-Perez was appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and affirmed in Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales. 261
The Fifth Circuit filed its decision on the same date as two other companion
cases: Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, involving charges of deportability for
the aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor, 262 and Vo v. Gonzales,
involving charges of deportability for two aggravated felonies, a crime of
violence and a theft or burglary offense.263 All three cases were heard and
decided by the same three-judge panel. 264 Brieva-Perez did not directly
challenge the Board’s interpretation of “statutory counterpart” in his
case, 265 although he did argue unsuccessfully that denying him the
opportunity to apply for 212(c) relief was a violation of equal protection. 266
The Fifth Circuit held, without much explanation, that he failed to
demonstrate he was being treated differently than other similarly situated
noncitizens. 267 Avilez-Granados was a relatively brief decision with little
analysis beyond citation to the Board’s decision in Blake. 268 The Fifth
Circuit’s rationale for adopting the Board’s rule requiring textual similarity
between the charged ground of deportability and a ground of inadmissibility

260. See, e.g., Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 772 n.4 (rejecting Brieva-Perez’s
argument that his conviction should be considered a theft offense for purposes of the
statutory counterpart analysis because he was charged with a crime of violence).
261. 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007).
262. 481 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 2007).
263. 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007).
264. Chief Judge Edith H. Jones wrote all three decisions; Judges Jacque L. Wiener and
Rhesa H. Barksdale also served on the panel. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 356; AvilezGranados, 481 F.3d at 869; Vo, 482 F.3d at 363.
265. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 359 n.2.
266. Id. at 361-62.
267. Id.
268. Avilez-Granados, 481 F.3d at 871-72.
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to constitute a statutory counterpart was contained primarily in the third
companion case, Vo. 269
Vo involved a respondent charged as deportable for two aggravated
felonies, a crime of violence and a theft or burglary offense, both based on
his Texas conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.270 After going
through the history of 212(c) relief and its expansion, the court held that
Vo’s unauthorized use of a motor vehicle conviction did not have a
statutory counterpart in the grounds of exclusion and therefore could not be
waived by section 212(c). 271 While this phrasing is somewhat odd in its
reference to the criminal offense rather than the ground(s) of deportability
charged, the court discussed Blake and Brieva-Perez in an overwhelmingly
positive manor, so it does not appear that the Fifth Circuit was trying to
alter the standard or analysis as laid out by the Board there. It is more likely
that the Fifth Circuit simply did not understand what it was doing in
referring to Vo’s conviction rather than his charges of deportability.
The Fifth Circuit considered multiple arguments raised by Vo against
endorsing the Blake/Brieva-Perez standard in his case. 272 Most
significantly, for purposes of this article, the court considered whether the
agency’s interpretation in Blake and Brieva-Perez was unreasonable as an
unjustified departure from past agency precedent 273 and whether application
of this rule to noncitizens in Vo’s circumstances would violate
constitutional equal protection rights.274 The court held first that the rule
announced by the Board in Blake was not new but longstanding: “Vo has
not demonstrated a substantial shift in agency practice sufficient to render
the BIA’s interpretation of its own regulation irrational or arbitrary and
capricious.” 275 Although the court used language identical to section
706(2)(A) of the APA, it did not cite to the APA or any other source in
269. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 366-72. All three decisions also cite to a prior Fifth
Circuit case, De La Paz Sanchez v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 2006), that
reached the same conclusion without explanation in reliance on the Board’s decision in
Matter of Brieva-Perez. Brieva-Perez, 482 F.3d at 362; Avilez-Granados, 481 F.3d at 872;
Vo, 482 F.3d at 369, 372.
270. 482 F.3d at 365.
271. Id. at 366-69.
272. Id. at 368-72.
273. Id. at 369-70.
274. Id. at 371-72. In addition to these two arguments, the court also rejected Vo’s claims
that the Board’s holding violated St. Cyr, that the regulation and the Board’s interpretation of
it in Blake and Brieva-Perez were ultra vires the statute, and that the Board’s interpretation
of the regulation rendered it internally inconsistent. Id. at 370-71.
275. Id. at 370.
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support of this standard. 276 On the question of equal protection, the Fifth
Circuit held that, even if excludable and deportable noncitizens could be
considered similarly situated, encouraging deportable aliens to leave the
country was a rational reason to distinguish between them by making
212(c) available to waive exclusion but not deportation. 277
Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit clearly followed the Board’s
position in all three cases—Brieva-Perez, Avilez-Granados, and Vo—the
Fifth Circuit’s discussion and application of the legal standard regarding
deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is particularly unclear
and confusing. First, none of the three cases cite to Chevron or invoke, even
without name, the Chevron two-step test. The court in Vo does briefly cite
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardoza-Fonseca when explaining Vo’s
argument that the Board’s interpretation does not deserve deference
because it impermissibly departs from past agency precedent, but that
citation comes without discussion of the standard.278 On the other side of
the coin, Vo alludes to congressional power and the plenary power doctrine:
“Additionally, in the immigration context, there is a particular need for
courts to defer to congressional choices.” 279
Second, despite being decided by the very same three-judge panel and
concerning the same basic legal issue, the discussion of deference is
different. Avilez-Granados and Vo contain the same stock sentence
regarding deference: “We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo,
according deference to the BIA’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions
of the INA.” 280 In support of that sentence, the court cites to the same Fifth
Circuit case: Carbajal-Gonzales v. INS. 281 Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales
contains essentially the same stock sentence with only minor, irrelevant
differences,282 but, surprisingly, cites to another Fifth Circuit case
altogether in support of the standard: Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore. 283

276. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2) (2012).
277. Vo, 482 F.3d at 371-72.
278. Id. at 369.
279. Id. at 372.
280. Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 2007); Vo, 482 F.3d at
366.
281. 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996).
282. 482 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Questions of law are reviewed de novo,
according deference to the BIA’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the INA.”).
283. Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 2006).
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Carbajal-Gonzales contains a very similar stock sentence at the end of
its recitation of the standard of review.284 In support of this sentence, it does
refer to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron by name. 285 The Chevron
test, or any kind of deference to an agency legal interpretation, however,
plays no more role in the court’s decision, probably because the court was
concerned with whether Carbajal-Gonzales’s conduct met a particular legal
standard (the grounds of deportability for entry without inspection and alien
smuggling) rather than the Board’s interpretation of any legal standard. 286
Hernandez-Castillo also contains a similar stock sentence, but one that
differs in at least one important word.287 Rather than referring simply to a
conclusion of law, the court in Hernandez-Castillo refers specifically to the
interpretation of an immigration regulation.288 In support, the court cites not
to Chevron, but to another Fifth Circuit decision, Lopez-Gomez v.
Ashcroft. 289 In Lopez-Gomez, the court was really concerned with
interpreting a regulation rather than some other source of law.290 In
Hernandez-Castillo, on the other hand, the court was discussing the
application of the repeal of 212(c); while there is the regulation enacted to
implement the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr, that regulation does not
appear to have been discussed or at issue in Hernandez-Castillo. 291
Hernandez-Castillo, then, probably cites Lopez-Gomez inappropriately; the
actual standard in Lopez-Gomez for review of agency interpretation of its
own regulations is inapplicable to the situation under consideration. 292
The court in Hernandez-Castillo goes on to make a statement
specifically about its own application of this standard of review in a case
involving section 212(c): “In this case, no deference is owed to the IJ’s

284. 78 F.3d at 197 (“This court reviews conclusions of law de novo (although with the
usual deference to the Board’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the Act . . . .”).
285. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
286. See id. at 197-201.
287. 436 F.3d at 519 (“We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, although we
defer to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration regulations if that interpretation is
reasonable.”).
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001)).
290. 263 F.3d at 444.
291. 436 F.3d 516.
292. While the standard for judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
rule is somewhat muddled, agency interpretation of a regulation is probably due less
deference (is less controlling) than agency interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Skidmore v.
Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
12.05[B] (6th ed. 2012).
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conclusion of law regarding the availability of § 212(c) relief because that
conclusion was based on principles of retroactivity rather than the content
of the immigration regulations.”293 Likely because of this seemingly helpful
statement, and probably unaware of the mis-citation in Hernandez-Castillo,
the Fifth Circuit in Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales compounds the mistake by
citing Hernandez-Castillo. Again, the same regulation implementing St.
Cyr was potentially at issue in Brieva-Perez, but there was no clear
indication that the court was focused on that regulation when discussing
deference. Even if the Brieva-Perez court was focused on interpreting the
regulation, it failed to explain why the interpretation of the regulation was
significant there but the interpretation of the statute was the focus in the
virtually identical situations in its companion cases Vo and AvilezGranados. Although it would indicate sloppy draftsmanship, the court in
Brieva-Perez may also have assumed that “regulation” was being used in its
general sense of a legal standard rather than in its specific sense of a rule
promulgated according to the APA’s requirements for notice and comment
rulemaking.
This may seem like overly finicky parsing of only tangentially relevant
language, and to a certain extent it is. I do not want to make too much of the
precise nature of the apparent mistakes made by the court, as that is not
what is important here. Rather, I want to highlight that such an error could
be made in one case in this context, where the same three-judge panel also
released decisions on the same legal issue in two other cases on the same
day where they did not make the same error. Furthermore, I want to
emphasize the subject matter of the mistake: the application of, and
standard for, deference to the agency’s interpretation of a provision of
immigration law. This issue paints in particularly stark relief the substantial
confusion among the circuit courts regarding just how to apply the ordinary
principles of administrative law to actions of the immigration agencies, at
least in the context of 212(c) relief.
Most of the circuit courts to consider a similar question agreed with the
Board in Blake and Brieva-Perez, and therefore agreed with the Fifth
Circuit in Brieva-Perez, Avilez-Granados, and Vo. The general consensus
was that (1) grounds of deportability could be waived by 212(c) only where
Congress had employed similar language to describe a substantially
equivalent category of excludable offenses and (2) most aggravated felonies
did not have a sufficiently similar statutory counterpart in the grounds of

293. 436 F.3d at 519.
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inadmissibility. 294 At least the First, 295 Third, 296 Seventh, 297 Eighth, 298 and
Eleventh 299 Circuits all took this position.
Most of these courts at least briefly considered and dismissed an equal
protection argument on the grounds that deportable noncitizens were not
similarly situated to excludable noncitizens where there was no
corresponding ground of inadmissibility. 300 Because these courts held that
equal protection concerns were not triggered, they had no opportunity to
consider whether there was some rational basis for the differing treatment
of noncitizens with less serious criminal convictions or the distinctions
between noncitizens charged as deportable or excludable.
Only three of the courts, the Third Circuit in Caroleo v. Gonzales, the
Eighth Circuit in Vue v. Gonzales, and the Eleventh Circuit in De la Rosa,
explicitly considered deference to the agency’s interpretation of the INA
under Chevron. 301 The Eighth Circuit in Vue announced that it gives
“substantial deference” to the Board’s statutory interpretations and lists the
Chevron two-step test. 302 It did not, however, appear to apply this standard
294. One notable exception is the aggravated felony illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(B) (2012). The Board of
Immigration Appeals held that this aggravated felony did have a comparable ground of
inadmissibility, violation of any law relating to a controlled substance under then INA §
212(a)(23). Matter of Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257, 258-59 (BIA 1991); see also Matter of
Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729 (BIA 2005), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Blake v.
Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2011).
295. Fontes v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2007) (aggravated felony, crime of
violence); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (same), abrogated by Judulang v.
Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
296. Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 2007) (aggravated felony, crime of
violence, and theft or burglary offense), abrogated by Judulang, 565 U.S. 42.
297. Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (aggravated felony,
sexual abuse of a minor); Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (same).
298. Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007) (aggravated felony, crime of
violence); Soriano v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (same).
299. De la Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) (aggravated felony,
sexual abuse of a minor); Rubio v. U.S. Att’y Gen, 182 Fed. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2006)
(aggravated felony, theft or burglary offense).
300. See De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1337-39; Zamora-Mallari, 514 F.3d at 692-93; Fontes,
483 F.3d at 120-23; Valere, 473 F.3d at 762; Vue, 496 F.3d at 861-62; Kim, 468 F.3d at 6263. The Third Circuit in Caroleo discussed equal protection only in its discussion of other
cases. 476 F.3d at 163, 165.
301. De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1332; Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 163, 165; Vue, 496 F.3d at 859.
302. Vue, 496 F.3d at 859 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005);
Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2004)) (“This court reviews the BIA’s
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in its analysis, despite the fact that it adopted the Board’s statutory
counterpart analysis for the application of 212(c) to waive grounds of
deportability. 303 The Eleventh Circuit did likewise.304
The Third Circuit in Caroleo first undertook its own discussion of cases
in other circuit courts. 305 The court then stated, without discussion of the
standard, that the Board’s interpretations of the INA were entitled to
deference and cited to Chevron as well as another Third Circuit case. 306 The
Third Circuit recognized
the seeming illogic of a scheme under which the crime of
attempted murder may constitute a crime involving moral
turpitude rendering the alien removable, while the same alien, if
charged with being removable under INA section 237’s
aggravated felony "crime of violence" ground, is ineligible for §
212(c) relief because a "crime of violence" is not a statutory
counterpart of a "crime involving moral turpitude." 307
However, it still did not discuss whether the Board’s decision was
unreasonable under step two of the Chevron standard and ultimately
adopted the Board’s interpretation.
c) The Second Circuit – Blake v. Carbone
The Second Circuit took the position contrary to the Fifth Circuit and
other circuits previously discussed. The Board’s decision in Blake
ultimately had the opposite outcome on appeal of the Board’s decision in
Brieva-Perez. Blake was appealed to the Second Circuit. 308 Although the
Board in Blake had asserted that its approach was consistent with Second
Circuit precedent, 309 the Second Circuit reversed and remanded in a
determinations on questions of law de novo, but gives substantial deference to its statutory
interpretations.”).
303. See id. at 859-62. Interestingly, the court goes back to an earlier BIA case, Matter of
Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (BIA 1984), rather than citing to the Board’s more recent
decisions in Blake or Brieva-Perez as the source for this analysis. Vue, 496 F.3d at 860.
304. See De la Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1335-37.
305. 476 F.3d at 163-67.
306. Id. at 166 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648
(3d Cir. 2006)).
307. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
308. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
309. Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728-29 (BIA 2005) (citing Drax v. Reno, 338
F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2003); Cato v. INS, 84 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1996)), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88.
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published decision. 310 The Second Circuit relied on the same equal
protection principle it had enunciated in Francis v. INS to hold that the
Board’s rule violated equal protection by treating similarly situated
noncitizens differently. 311 The court held that the focus should be on the
offense itself rather than on the ground of deportability. 312 That is, a
noncitizen will be eligible for a waiver under the former section 212(c) if
the offense that he or she is seeking to waive would also render him or her
inadmissible. 313
The Second Circuit in Blake considered but rejected the government’s
argument that they should defer to the Board’s interpretation of eligibility
for a 212(c) waiver. 314 The court seems to have primarily based its analysis
on step one of the Chevron analysis, holding that there was no ambiguity in
the language of the 212(c) statute itself, and that therefore the court and the
agency must defer to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 315
There is also language in the court’s decision, however, that suggests that
the Second Circuit viewed the situation as falling outside of the Chevron
framework entirely. 316 Any difficulty in apply section 212(c), the court
noted, arose not from the statute but from the BIA’s “gloss” on the Second
Circuit’s prior decision in Francis. 317 Francis had interpreted 212(c) to
avoid a constitutional infirmity—the violation of equal protection—that
would have otherwise existed. 318
None of the other circuits officially adopted or indicated approval of the
Second Circuit’s position in Blake. At least two of the circuits did,
however, remand with instructions to consider the Second Circuit’s
position. 319 The Seventh Circuit, in a published decision regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel, stated that, on remand, the Board “may
wish to reconsider its prejudice ruling in light of the Second Circuit's

310. Blake, 489 F.3d at 105.
311. Id. at 91.
312. Id. at 104.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 100 (“We find no reason to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory
counterpart rule . . . .”).
315. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984)).
316. Id. (“We . . . conclude that the BIA’s comparable grounds analysis fails to comport
with Francis.”).
317. Id.
318. Id. (citing Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 898 (2d Cir. 1993)).
319. See, e.g., Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 688 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008).
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decision in Blake v. Carbone.” 320 The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished
decision, remanded to the Board to directly reconsider the respondent’s
eligibility for 212(c) where the Board relied on its previous decision in
Blake to find him ineligible. 321
d) The Ninth Circuit – Abebe v. Mukasey
Despite the multiplicity of outcomes, standards, and frameworks in the
cases previously discussed, the rule adopted by the Second Circuit in
Francis and the Board in Silva remained the underlying bedrock. Individual
courts, likely frustrated with the resulting complexity of the law, did
criticize these decisions. 322 By and large, however, courts did not consider
overruling or departing from their holding that it would violate equal
protection to deny similarly situated noncitizens charged as deportable the
opportunity to apply for relief under section 212(c). The Second Circuit’s
decision in Blake, holding that 212(c) must be available for all offenses that
would also render an alien excludable, followed directly from Francis. 323
Even the Fifth Circuit in the Brieva-Perez trio of cases, in addition to other
courts refusing to expand Francis beyond grounds of deportability having
textually similar excludability counterparts, did not seriously question the
underlying holding in Francis and Silva. 324 The Ninth Circuit was initially
part of this group, affirmatively adopting the rule of Francis and Silva in a
1981 case, Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 325 but thereafter resisting further expansion

320. Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 341, 344 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007). The Board
had previously held that Gutierrez-Almazan could not demonstrate prejudice because he was
ineligible for 212(c) relief. Id. (“Gutierrez-Almazan also challenges the BIA's holding that
he could not show prejudice from Trigo's ineffective assistance because he was ineligible for
a § 212(c) waiver.").
321. Palomino-Abad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 229 Fed. App'x. 891, 892 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“Without expressing any opinion about the issues raised in Palomino’s petition for review
or Palomino’s eligibility for § 212(c) relief, we GRANT the petition, VACATE the order
denying reconsideration, and REMAND this case to the BIA for the purpose of allowing the
BIA to consider Palomino’s motion to reconsider in light of Blake v. Carbone.”).
322. See, e.g., Blake, 489 F.3d at 105. (“While hindsight might pin much of this
confusion on Francis, we are bound to finish what our predecessors started.”); Kim v.
Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2006), abrogated by Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42
(2011).
323. See Blake, 489 F.3d at 101-05.
324. Breiva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007); Avilez-Granados v.
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007).
325. 640 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (per curiam).
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of the availability of 212(c). 326 After initially mirroring the approach of the
Board and the Fifth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit ultimately took a
third approach in a case called Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), an
aggressively litigated case resulting in multiple different decisions. 327
The Ninth Circuit first decided Abebe v. Gonzales (Abebe I) in 2007. 328
Abebe was charged as deportable for an aggravated felony conviction,
specifically sexual abuse of a minor, based on his California conviction for
lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child.329 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Board correctly determined that Abebe was not eligible for a waiver under
section 212(c) because this aggravated felony did not have a comparable
ground of inadmissibility. 330 The Ninth Circuit engaged in a relatively
straightforward application of the Chevron two-step test to the Board’s
interpretation of 212(c) as announced in its decisions in Blake and BrievaPerez. 331 While it is certainly possible to disagree substantively with not
only the outcome but also with multiple aspects of the legal holdings of this
decision, the court’s opinion here is a model of clarity in comparison to
many of the decisions previously discussed. It is at a minimum apparent
what test the Ninth Circuit was applying, what it was holding at each step
of the analysis, and why it so held.
The Ninth Circuit initially held in Abebe I that, at step one of the
Chevron test, Congress had not spoken clearly; 212(c) itself was subject to
multiple interpretations.332 This portion of the holding was made without
significant discussion or application of a legal standard, but was
presumably based in large part on the court’s extensive discussion of the
history of the 212(c) provision earlier in its decision.333 The court then went
on to consider step two of the Chevron analysis—that is, to determine
whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. The court considered
first the consistency of the Board’s interpretation with the statute,
regulations, and prior agency practice; and second constitutional concerns

326. See Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Abebe II,
554 F.3d 1203; Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Abebe
II, 554 F.3d 1203.
327. 554 F.3d 1203.
328. 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007.
329. Id. at 1094-95.
330. Id. at 1094.
331. Id. at 1100-01 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
332. Id. at 1101.
333. Id. at 1096-1101.
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raised by the Board’s position. 334 On the equal protection question, the
court relied on its prior decision in Komarenko to hold that there was no
violation.335 Because Abebe was not “facing deportation on a basis which
'is identical to a statutory ground for exclusion for which discretionary
relief would be available,'” there were not actually two similarly situated
groups being treated differently. 336 The court again specifically refused to
extend its holding in Tapia-Acuna beyond the limited situation of grounds
of deportability with textually similar excludability counterparts. 337
This Ninth Circuit decision in Abebe I, however, did not survive. After a
somewhat tortured procedural history, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit
issued the court’s final substantive decision in the Abebe II litigation on
January 5, 2009. 338 Despite strong opposition from both the concurrence 339
and the dissent, 340 the panel in Abebe II overruled the Ninth Circuit’s
previous decision in Tapia-Acuna and withdrew from the court’s adoption
of the standard in Francis and Silva. 341 The court held that refusing to allow
noncitizens charged as deportable to avail themselves of the 212(c) waiver
of inadmissibility did not violate equal protection because there was a
rational basis for Congress to distinguish between noncitizens charged as
inadmissible and those charged as deportable: “Congress could have limited
section 212(c) relief to aliens seeking to enter the country from abroad in
order 'to create[] an incentive for deportable aliens to leave the country.'” 342
The court therefore concluded that a waiver under section 212(c) was not
available to Abebe to waive his deportability as an aggravated felon. 343
Unlike in its previous decision in Abebe I, the Ninth Circuit here did not

334. Id. at 1101-05.
335. Id. at 1104-05.
336. Id. at 1104 (quoting Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled
by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam)); see also id. at 1105
(“Had [Abebe] left the United States and returned after his conviction, he could not have
been excluded on a 'sexual abuse of a minor' theory because no such ground of
inadmissibility exists.”).
337. Id. at 1104-05.
338. 554 F.3d 1203.
339. Id. at 1208-13 (Clifton, J., concurring).
340. Id. at 1213-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 1207 (majority opinion).
342. Id. at 1206 (alteration in original) (quoting Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190
F.3d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2009)).
343. Id. at 1207.
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refer to Chevron or any other kind of deference to an agency
determination. 344
Abebe’s request for en banc panel rehearing or full court rehearing en
banc was denied over a vehement dissent on August 18, 2009. 345 Abebe
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, but his petition
was denied on May 17, 2010. 346 Amidst the multiple decisions in the Abebe
litigation, however, another case involving the same legal question worked
its way up to the Ninth Circuit and would eventually be heard by the
Supreme Court in Judulang v. Holder. 347
3. The Supreme Court – Judulang v. Holder
Judulang was placed in removal proceedings on a charge that a
conviction for voluntary manslaughter was an aggravated felony crime of
violence and therefore rendered him removable from the United States. 348
The BIA found him ineligible for relief under the former section 212(c)
because, it held, aggravated felony crimes of violence do not have a
substantially similar statutory counterpart in the grounds of exclusion. 349
The Ninth Circuit agreed in an unpublished and brief decision, relying on
its initial decision in Abebe I as controlling. 350 Only two short paragraphs of
the opinion were devoted to this holding, with no new analysis or
explanation. 351 In addition to Abebe I, the court cited only to the Board’s
decision in Brieva-Perez and the Third Circuit’s opinion in Caroleo. 352

344. The dissenting opinion does cite to Chevron and point out related implications of the
court’s decisions, but does not otherwise discuss or apply Chevron deference. Id. at 1217
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“By holding that the statutory language of section 212(c) is clear
and that Francis and Tapia-Acuna did not 'accord[] sufficient deference' to Congress, the
majority has implicitly questioned DHS’s authority to enact the above regulation. Under the
majority rule, the regulation that has been applied in thousands of cases cannot survive.”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
345. Abebe v. Holder (Abebe III), 577 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (mem.).
346. Abebe v. Holder, 560 U.S. 903 (2010) (mem.).
347. 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
348. Id. at 51-52.
349. Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 Fed. App’x 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd and
remanded, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42.
350. Id. (citing Abebe I, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent
decisions in the Abebe litigation occurred after this decision in Judulang. See Abebe III, 577
F.3d 1113.
351. Judulang, 249 Fed. App’x at 502.
352. Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Judulang on April 18, 2011, to
resolve a circuit split. 353 Oral arguments were held on October 12, 2011,
and the Supreme Court issued its decision on December 12, 2011.354 The
Court rejected the Chevron and equal protection frameworks that the Ninth
Circuit had relied on below to find Judulang ineligible for section 212(c)
relief and that are the two common threads running through the
jurisprudence on the expansion of 212(c).355 Instead, the Court chose to
analyze the case through the lens of the APA. 356
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . .
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 357 The Supreme Court explained that, in order to
comply with this section of the statute, an agency—when setting policy—
must provide a reasoned explanation, based on “non-arbitrary, 'relevant
factors,'” for its choices.358 In the immigration context, this means “that the
BIA's approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration
system.” 359 The Supreme Court held that the BIA’s approach failed this
test: “Rather than considering factors that might be thought germane to the
deportation decision, that policy hinges § 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant
comparison between statutory provisions.” 360 The Court used highly critical
language to highlight at length what it viewed as the extreme and
multilayered arbitrariness of the BIA’s holding. 361 It described the

353. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52 n.6 (“Compare Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (C.A.2
2007) (rejecting the BIA's approach and holding instead that '[i]f the offense that renders [an
alien] deportable would render a similarly situated [alien] excludable, the deportable [alien]
is eligible for a waiver of deportation'), with Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403, 412-14
(C.A.6 2009) (upholding the comparable-grounds policy); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d
158, 162-63, 168 (C.A.3 2007) (same); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62-63 (C.A.1 2006)
(same).”).
354. 565 U.S. 42.
355. The Court did not reach the equal protection argument, finding it unnecessary given
its holding that the Board’s position was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 54 n.8. As discussed
below, the Court considered and rejected the Chevron framework. Id. at 52 n.7.
356. Id. at 52-53.
357. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
358. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See id. at 55-59.
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comparable-grounds rule as turning deportation decisions into a “sport of
chance.” 362
The government argued before the Supreme Court that the Board’s
position was not arbitrary and capricious for three separate reasons: (1) it
was more consistent with the statutory language, (2) the Board’s approach
had been consistent and longstanding, and (3) the comparable-grounds rule
saved the government time and money. 363 The Court rejected each of these
arguments in turn. 364
Judulang in his initial brief argued his case under the APA arbitrary and
capricious framework. 365 He did not explain why this approach was more
appropriate than the Chevron deference relied on by the Ninth Circuit
below, but did state in a footnote that both the analysis and the result would
be the same under Chevron: “Whether understood under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), or under the second step of Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), the standard is the
same: whether the BIA’s policy is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’” 366
The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued the case under Chevron
deference 367 without addressing the use of the arbitrary and capricious
framework, other than to assert that Judulang conceded the applicability of
Chevron. 368 None of the amicus briefs addressed this choice between
administrative law frameworks. This is somewhat remarkable given the
significant shift this represented; none of the prior major cases on the
expansion of 212(c) to deportability had invoked the APA arbitrary and
capricious standard.

362. Id. at 58-59 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878,
879 (2nd Cir. 1947)).
363. Id. at 59-64.
364. Id.
365. Brief for Petitioner at 31-55, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Judulang’s
petition for certiorari proceeded in the same manner, arguing that the BIA’s interpretation
was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA without discussing why this framework
should be substituted for the Chevron deference employed by the Ninth Circuit below.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, 26, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694).
366. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 44 n.16 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)).
367. Brief for Respondent at 18-30, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Specifically,
the Attorney General argued that the statutory language of 212(c) is ambiguous at Chevron
step one and the Board’s reasonable interpretation of that language was entitled to deference
at Chevron step two. Id. at 18-20.
368. Id. at 19.
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The Supreme Court addressed the choice of framework only in a
footnote. Before electing to proceed under the framework of the APA, the
Supreme Court specifically considered Chevron but found Chevron
deference inapplicable to the situation at hand.369 The Court explained that
in order for Chevron deference to be triggered, the agency must be
interpreting a statute it has been charged with administering. 370 The Board’s
comparable-grounds rule could not be a statutory interpretation, in
significant part because 212(c) does not even mention grounds of
deportation. 371
The Supreme Court makes a point of saying, however, that it would
undergo the same analysis and reach the same conclusion at step two of the
Chevron analysis if it had elected to proceed in that direction: “Were we to
do so, our analysis would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we
ask whether an agency interpretation is 'arbitrary or capricious in
substance.'” 372 The Court thereby implies, although it does not state, that it
would find Congress had not spoken clearly in the statute itself at Chevron
step one; that it would not use the statutory interpretation principle of
constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute at Chevron step one; and
that it would not need to rely on constitutional avoidance arguments to
reject the agency’s comparable-grounds rule as unreasonable at Chevron
step two. 373
Both Judulang and the Attorney General (as well as an amicus brief)
addressed equal protection arguments at some substantial length. 374
Judulang framed his equal protection argument as part of the arbitrary and
capricious analysis, 375 while the Attorney General addressed equal
protection as part of its Chevron step-two analysis. 376 The Supreme Court,
however, also relegated its treatment of equal protection to a footnote and
appeared to treat equal protection as a stand-alone question. 377 The Court
indicated that it did not appear as though similarly situated noncitizens were
369. Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 at 52 n.7.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
53 (2011)).
373. See id.
374. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 51-53; Brief for Respondent, supra note 367,
at 49-54; Brief for Amici Curiae 39 Immigration Law Professors In Support Of Petitioner at
6-19, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694).
375. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 51-53.
376. Brief for Respondent, supra note 367, at 49-54.
377. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 54 n.8.
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being treated differently, but declined to reach the equal protection
argument given its holding that the BIA’s comparable-grounds analysis was
arbitrary and capricious. 378
Notably, the Supreme Court did not tell the BIA what test it should
adopt; it simply stated that the test the BIA had chosen was arbitrary and
capricious. 379 The question of which alternative test to select and apply was
left to the Board to decide in a subsequent case. 380 The Board made this
selection in a February 2014 decision in a case called Matter of
Abdelghany, a case that was pending at the time the Supreme Court decided
Judulang in 2011. 381 The Board in Abdelghany engaged in lengthy
discussion of the history of congressional limitations in 212(c) relief, the
Supreme Court precedents Judulang and St. Cyr, and the strengths and
weaknesses of the various available alternatives to the comparable-grounds
test. Ultimately, the Board adopted the same test it had endorsed in its
Hernandez-Casillas opinion twenty-some years earlier.382 That is,
“otherwise qualified applicants may apply for section 212(c) relief in
removal proceedings to waive any ground of deportability, unless the
applicant is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility” specifically excluded
by section 212(c). 383 The Board then went on to consider and resolve other
contested aspects of eligibility for relief under the former section 212(c) in
an extremely comprehensive decision for the stated purpose of adopting a
“uniform nationwide rule.” 384 Despite this lofty goal, however, unanswered
questions remain in the 212(c) context. 385

378. Id.
379. Id. at 57-58, 64 (“Again, we do not say today that the BIA must give all deportable
aliens meeting § 212(c)'s requirements the chance to apply for a waiver. The point is instead
that the BIA cannot make that opportunity turn on the meaningless matching of statutory
grounds.” (citation omitted)).
380. Id. at 64; Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 259 (BIA 2014) (“After St.
Cyr and Judulang, the basic question remains: which deportable lawful permanent residents
may apply for section 212(c) relief?”).
381. Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 265-66.
382. Id.; Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 262-66 (BIA 1990, A.G.
1991) aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished
table decision).
383. Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 266.
384. Id. at 266-72.
385. See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 748 F.3d 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Abdelghany
in support of holding 212(c) relief available for a conviction obtained after trial).
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4. Post-Repeal: Preliminary Conclusions
As in the pre-repeal decisions on the contours of the expanded
application of 212(c), some of the post-repeal decisions referenced
Congress’ power to regulate immigration and cited to plenary power
cases. 386 All of the significant circuit court cases, however, also applied
ordinary administrative and constitutional law principles. Not only did no
court seriously question whether these ordinary principles were applicable
in the immigration realm, Chevron deference, arbitrary and capricious
review, and equal protection became more deeply entrenched in this
context. As a result, court decisions applying these principles began to more
extensively explain and explore them.
Just as in the pre-repeal cases, the courts in the post-repeal decisions
continued to vary as to which administrative and constitutional law
doctrines were invoked. In addition, even when invoking the same
principles, in the post-repeal cases differences in how each individual
doctrine was interpreted and applied began to be discernable. Patterns
remain extraordinarily difficult to identify, but there are several points of
note.
First, the courts again did not apply a very high level of deference to the
agency. Even in those decisions that ultimately agreed with the agency’s
position, the courts did not spend a great deal of time identifying or
discussing the doctrine of deference they were applying. They primarily
undertook their own detailed analyses of the question independently of the
agency’s analysis and the factors that the agency considered.
Administrative law doctrines of deference were also used by the courts to
overturn agency positions, most notably by the Supreme Court in
Judulang. 387
Second, as some more detailed discussions of the administrative and
constitutional law principles occurred in the case law, the radical
differences between circuits—and even within a single circuit—in
interpreting and applying those doctrines became even more apparent. For
example, when should APA arbitrary and capricious review be triggered
instead of Chevron deference? Should equal protection and other
constitutional questions be subsumed within step two of Chevron or the
386. See, e.g., Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress has particularly
broad and sweeping powers when it comes to immigration, and is therefore entitled to an
additional measure of deference when it legislates as to admission, exclusion, removal,
naturalization or other matters pertaining to aliens.”).
387. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 54 (2011).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/1

2017]

212(C) AND 212(H) WAIVERS

171

arbitrary and capricious analysis? Or should equal protection be treated as a
stand-alone question? Does the substantive logic of an agency interpretation
have a role in arbitrary and capricious review or only in Chevron’s
reasonableness inquiry? Just how deferential should courts be when
assessing the arbitrariness, capriciousness, or reasonableness of an agency
position?
D. Expansion of 212(h) Waivers to Deportability
Despite the apparent surface similarities between waivers under the
former section 212(c) and waivers under 212(h), litigation to expand the
applicability of 212(h) to waive charges of deportability has taken a very
different path. It began more slowly, picking up speed only in recent years,
and has not produced nearly the same volume of cases as the 212(c)
litigation. 388 Perhaps more importantly, these challenges in the 212(h)
context have reached very different results. Section 212(h), when used
alone to waive a charge of deportability, unconnected to a prior entry or an
application to adjust status, is called a stand-alone 212(h) waiver. 389 While
Francis and Silva held unequivocally that a failure to allow stand-alone
212(c) waivers would be unconstitutional, arguments to expand the
applicability of 212(h) to this pure stand-alone context have been almost
exclusively unsuccessful.
This subpart traces these challenges. Section D.1 covers the initial
expansion of the availability of 212(h) to waive deportability under some
circumstances. Section D.2 describes the circuit court cases that halted that
expansion. Then Section D.3 addresses the BIA’s decision that went further
to contract the availability of 212(h) for LPRs charged as deportable and its
aftermath in the circuit courts. The discussion in all three of these sections
focuses not only on the outcomes of the cases but also on the invocation of
Congress’ plenary power over immigration and the use of the three legal
388. There is no definitive explanation for why 212(h) has historically spawned less
litigation, but several factors may contribute. Section 212(h) is a narrower form of relief that
212(c)—it both waives fewer convictions and is more difficult to obtain in may
circumstances because of the extreme hardship element that does not exist for 212(c). Prior
to the repeal of 212(c) in 1996, 212(c) was almost always available and preferable when
212(h) was an option. After 212(c) was repealed, however, there are increasing
circumstances in which 212(h) will be available and 212(c) (and perhaps even Cancellation
of Removal) are not. As the importance of 212(h) has grown, questions about 212(h) are
increasingly frequently litigated.
389. See, e.g., Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130 (BIA 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
1414 (2015); Michael Vastine, The Status of Standalone INA § 212(h) Waivers: Can Rivas
Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny?, 2013 EMERGING ISSUES 7039 (Lexis) (July 19, 2013).
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frameworks discussed above in the 212(c) context: Chevron deference,
equal protection, and arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.
Finally, Section D.4 draws some preliminary conclusions from the
application of these general constitutional and administrative law
frameworks in the 212(h) expansion context. Despite the greater uniformity
in doctrine and outcome for 212(h) as compared to 212(c), the case law
raises equal, if not greater, questions.
1. Initial Expansion
The distinction between 212(c) and 212(h) has not always existed; there
was a point in time at which it appeared that the expanded application of
these two separate waivers would proceed along parallel tracks. The BIA
held in multiple cases that 212(h) waivers were available in deportation
proceedings nunc pro tunc when the facts that are the basis for deportability
made the noncitizen inadmissible at the time of his or her last entry. 390 The
Board even discussed and analogized to a 212(c) nunc pro tunc case, Matter
of Tanori, in this context. 391 The Board further held that noncitizens in
deportation proceedings were eligible for 212(h) waivers in conjunction
with applications to adjust status.392 None of these decisions discussed
equal protection or, of course, deference.
In the 1995 Yeung v. INS case, which involved a request for a standalone 212(h) waiver, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took the
same step further as the Second Circuit in Francis had in the 212(c)
context.393 Yeung was an LPR deportable as a noncitizen convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry because of his

390. See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218, 222-23 (BIA 1980), overruled by
Matter of Rivas, 261 I. & N. Dec. 130, 134 (BIA 2013); Matter of Bernabella, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 42, 43 (BIA 1968); Matter of Mascorro-Perales, 12 I. & N. Dec. 228, 229 (BIA 1967);
Matter of Millard, 11 I. & N. Dec. 175, 177 (BIA 1965); Matter of P-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 713,
713 (BIA 1958).
391. See Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (citing Matter of Tanori, 15 I. & N. Dec. 566
(BIA 1976)).
392. See, e.g., Matter of Parodi, 17 I. & N. Dec. 608, 611-12 (BIA 1980); Bernabella, 13
I. & N. Dec. at 43-44.
393. 76 F.3d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1995), modified 72 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1996). It does
not appear that there were any earlier published precedential Board of Immigration Appeals
decisions ruling one way or the other on the availability of stand-alone 212(h) waivers in
deportation proceedings outside of the nunc pro tunc and adjustment of status contexts. See
Yeung v. INS, 72 F.3d 843, 843 (11th Cir. 1996), modifying 76 F.3d 337 (1995) (remanding
with directions to the Board to reconsider its precedents only in Sanchez, Parodi, and Yeung
itself); see also Vastine, supra note 389.
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conviction for attempted manslaughter. 394 He needed a stand-alone 212(h)
waiver because he could not file for adjustment of status, and he had not
left the United States and returned after his conviction, so he could not
benefit from the nunc pro tunc waiver allowed under prior case law.395
The very same equal protection question was raised, then, as was in the
212(c) cases: can the law distinguish between LPRs who travel outside the
United States and those who do not? The court held that it could not. It
applied minimal scrutiny under the rational basis standard of review, and
found that this distinction between groups “can only be characterized as
arbitrary” and “is without ‘a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.’” 396 The Eleventh Circuit explicitly found the Second Circuit’s
decision in Francis, holding the same in the 212(c) context, to be
analogous. 397
The court did not discuss or apply any kind of deference to the agency’s
contrary interpretation of the applicability of 212(h) in its initial decision.
However, on a petition for rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit added a
paragraph remanding to the BIA with instructions to reconsider its prior
interpretation of 212(h) in Sanchez, Parodi, and Yeung, “consistent with the
competing statutory, constitutional, and policy interests at stake.”398 In
support of this remand with instructions, the Eleventh Circuit cited to
Chevron. 399 By the time the Board issued its decision on remand, however,
Congress had passed IIRIRA, which made 212(h) unavailable to LPRs who,
like Yeung, had been convicted of an aggravated felony. 400 Because Yeung
would no longer be eligible for a 212(h) waiver in any event, the Board
specifically declined to rule on the scope of availability of 212(h) to waive
charges of deportability. 401

394. Yeung, 76 F.3d at 337.
395. Id. at 338; see also, e.g., Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 223.
396. Yeung, 76 F.3d at 340 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
397. Id.
398. Yeung v. INS, 72 F.3d 843, 843 (11th Cir. 1996).
399. Id.
400. Matter of Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610, 611-12 (BIA 1996).
401. Id. at 612. The Board does not appear to have reconsidered its interpretation of
212(h) and its position in Sanchez in another case prior to Matter of Rivas. See Poveda v.
U.S. Att’y General, 692 F.3d 1168, 1181 (11th Cir. 2012) (Martin, J., dissenting); Matter of
Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 131-34 (BIA 2013).
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2. Halting the Expansion
After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Yeung, 212(c) and 212(h) did not
continue in the same expansive direction. Unlike after Francis, when the
Board acted quickly to affirmatively adopt the Second Circuit’s holding
regarding 212(c) and therefore apply it uniformly throughout the country,
the Board did not so act in the 212(h) context. Furthermore, no circuit
courts have agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in Yeung, and several have
affirmatively disagreed.402
The Board did, however, initially continue to acknowledge the
availability of 212(h) for deportable LPRs to waive grounds of
inadmissibility nunc pro tunc to a prior entry and in conjunction with an
application to adjust status. 403 The Board and the circuit courts cited to
Sanchez even after Congress constricted the availability of 212(h) for LPRs
as part of IIRIRA in 1996. 404
a) The Seventh, Fifth, and Third Circuits
The Seventh Circuit in Klementanovsky v. Gonzales 405 and the Fifth
Circuit in Cabral v. Holder 406 declined to expand the Board’s holdings in
Sanchez and Parodi to allow stand-alone 212(h) waivers. Both courts held
that denying deportable noncitizens the ability to apply for a 212(h) waiver
did not violate equal protection because there were multiple potential
rational reasons for distinguishing “between those criminal aliens who seek
to be admitted to the United States, and those criminal aliens who are being
deported from the United States.” 407 The Third Circuit in an unpublished
decision, Montano v. United States Attorney General, agreed. 408 Possible
reasons offered by the three courts included the following:
Congress might have wanted to ensure that dangerous people,
including those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, remain
outside the United States while their applications for
402. See KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTRS., UPDATE ON INA §
212(H) DEFENSE STRATEGIES 19 (2011), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/update_on_
ina_212_1.pdf.
403. See, e.g., Matter of Loaisiga, No. A28 644 366, 2008 WL 1924655 (BIA Apr. 8,
2008); see also Vastine, supra note 389.
404. See, e.g., Margulis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 787-89 (7th Cir. 2013); Matter of
Abosi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 204, 206 (BIA 2007).
405. 501 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2007).
406. 632 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 2011).
407. Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 792; see also Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893.
408. 350 Fed. App’x 643 (3rd Cir. 2009).
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discretionary relief are being considered. Congress might have
wanted aliens seeking such waivers to do so from outside the
United States in order to discourage them from attempting to
“fly under the radar” of the immigration authorities in the event
that the discretionary waiver is ultimately denied. Congress
might have rationalized that an alien who self-deports and
returns through proper admission procedures provides
immigration authorities a second bite at the apple to intercept
and consider otherwise unlawful aliens. Congress might have
rationalized that granting a waiver to those who self-deport and
seek readmission at the borders provides an incentive for such
aliens to voluntarily depart at their own expense.409
Commentators also suggested that the Ninth Circuit, were it to take up
this issue, would decide in accordance with these three circuits given its
decision in Abebe withdrawing from the Francis equal protection rationale
even in the 212(c) context. 410
The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in these three cases focused
exclusively on equal protection. They did not discuss deference to the
agency interpretation of 212(h)—Chevron or otherwise—or any
requirements imposed by the APA. The Fifth Circuit in Cabral attempted to
distinguish the 212(c) context and the Second Circuit’s decision in
Francis. 411 Despite the factual situations and prior legal histories being
virtually identical, the Fifth Circuit attempted to describe the groups being
distinguished between differently than the Second Circuit had done in
Francis. The Fifth Circuit described the court in Francis as pointing out
that the distinction at issue was between deportable LPRs who had traveled
outside the United States and those who had not.412 Factually, this was also
the case in Cabral, but the court there chose to describe the two groups as
those who were being deported and those who were being excluded. 413 This

409. Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 792-93; see also Cabral, 632 F.3d at 892-93;
Montano, 350 Fed. App’x at 647.
410. See Brady, supra note 402, at 19.
411. Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94. Cabral appears to have relied on the Second Circuit’s
decision in Francis rather than the more applicable Board decision in Silva. Id. at 893. The
Seventh Circuit in Klementanovsky discussed a prior Seventh Circuit case drawing this same
distinction. 501 F.3d at 793-94 (citing LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir.
1998)).
412. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976).
413. Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94.
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allowed the Fifth Circuit to analyze differently the possible rational bases
for Congress’ decision to draw this distinction.
b) The Eleventh Circuit
For many years, it appeared that the Eleventh Circuit would stand by its
decision in Yeung and continue to interpret 212(h) as allowing at least some
noncitizens to waive their charges of deportability. 414 Today, however, even
the Eleventh Circuit has retreated from Yeung. In a 2012 case called Poveda
v. United States Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals that there was no equal
protection violation as there was a rational basis to distinguish between
excludable noncitizens’ and deportable noncitizens’ respective eligibility
for relief under section 212(h). 415 The court in Poveda cited to
Klementanovsky and Cabral and offered the same possible reasonable
explanations for this distinction. 416
The court in Poveda also went beyond the pure equal protection
framework of the cases previously discussed to attempt to address a number
of other issues. First, Poveda stated that the court was not overruling its
previous decision in Yeung, but instead attempted to distinguish the current
circumstances from those when Yeung was decided. 417 The court explained
that the Board had previously held that 212(h), like 212(c), was available
nunc pro tunc to noncitizens who departed the United States after a criminal
conviction that rendered them inadmissible but had not actually been
charged with inadmissibility on reentry. 418 According to the court, the
distinction that concerned the courts in Yeung and Francis was between
those noncitizens charged as deportable who were allowed to request
waivers nunc pro tunc to their prior entries and those who had not departed
414. See Lanier v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.1 (2011). Lanier was a lawful
permanent resident charged as deportable in removal proceedings as the result of an
aggravated felony conviction. Id. at 1365. The legal question at issue in the case was
whether the aggravated felony bar to 212(h) applied to those who adjusted status to lawful
permanent residence, but the Eleventh Circuit cited Yeung in a footnote in support of the
statement that 212(h) was available to noncitizens in removal proceedings. Id. at 1364 n.1
(citing Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1995)). As Lanier was charged as
deportable, this statement also must have meant available to waive essentially all grounds of
deportability or the question of the applicability of the aggravated felony bar would have
been moot. See also Vastine, supra note 389.
415. 692 F.3d 1168, 1176-78 (11th Cir. 2012).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1174.
418. Id.
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the United States and therefore would not be eligible for waivers. The court
held, however—citing only to the Seventh Circuit decision in
Klementanovsky and without an on-point citation to Board precedent—that
the Board had retreated from this position in the 212(h) context and no
longer believed that 212(h) was available nunc pro tunc. 419
The court also attempted to distinguish the circumstances at issue in
Yeung from those in Poveda by focusing on the shift in IIRIRA from a
focus on physical entry into the United States to a focus on lawful
inspection and admission. 420 Under IIRIRA’s new definition of those
seeking admission, LPRs with criminal convictions who traveled outside
the country would be deemed to be seeking admission and subject to the
grounds of inadmissibility. 421 Although the court’s decision on this point is
not entirely clear, it appeared to be saying that continuing to allow nunc pro
tunc or stand-alone 212(h) waivers would be inconsistent with these
extensive changes made by Congress. 422 Finally, the court briefly tried to
distinguish 212(h) from the earlier 212(c) cases and the holdings in Francis
and Silva by quoting from an earlier Eleventh Circuit case defining the two
groups at issue as being deportable non-citizens and inadmissible noncitizens rather than two different groups of deportable non-citizens. 423
Ultimately, the court held that there was not the same two groups as in the
212(c) cases being treated differently and therefore there was no longer an
equal protection violation.424 The court was essentially drawing the same
fine line that the Fifth Circuit in Cabral had also somewhat unsuccessfully
used to try to distinguish the 212(h) context.
Second, unlike the other circuits in the 212(h) context, the court in
Poveda discussed and applied Chevron deference. 425 The court held at
Chevron step one that Congress had not spoken clearly. 426 It therefore went
419. Id. at 1174, 1176. The dissent disagreed on this point in particular, arguing that the
Board had not abandoned Sanchez and had in fact applied it in Poveda’s own case. Id. at
1182-85 (Martin, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 1174-76 (majority opinion).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1178 (quoting Chuang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.
2004)). The Eleventh Circuit both in Poveda and Chuang appears to be operating from the
misunderstanding that noncitizens charged as excludable or inadmissible will remain outside
the United States while their exclusion or removal proceedings are conducted. See id.;
Chuang, 382 F.3d at 1304; cf. Vastine, supra note 389.
424. Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1174.
425. Id. at 1176-78.
426. Id. at 1176.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

178

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:111

on to consider at Chevron step two whether the agency had acted
reasonably in its interpretation that 212(h) was not available as a standalone waiver of deportability: “Because section 212(h) is silent about
whether an alien within our borders may obtain a hardship waiver without
concurrently applying for an adjustment of status, we must consider
whether the new interpretation of section 212(h) by the Board is
reasonable.” 427 In two different places in its decision, in discussing the
Chevron reasonableness inquiry, the Court emphasized the particular level
of deference due to the executive branch in the immigration context.428
The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation was in fact
reasonable. 429 Despite its emphasis on deference to the agency’s
interpretation, much of the discussion on reasonableness focused not on the
Board’s opinions but on the other circuits’ decisions in Klementanovsky and
Cabral. 430 Klementanovsky’s and Cabral’s equal protection analyses were
collapsed into the Poveda court’s reasonableness inquiry. It appears as
though the Eleventh Circuit in Poveda was saying that, if there was a
rational basis to distinguish between inadmissible and deportable
noncitizens for purposes of eligibility for 212(h), then the Board’s
interpretation prohibiting stand-alone 212(h) to waive grounds of
deportability was reasonable.
Poveda did not stand for long as the Eleventh Circuit’s only opinion on
stand-alone 212(h); less than one year later another panel of the Eleventh
Circuit issued a second decision addressing essentially the same issue in
Lawal v. United States Attorney General. 431 Like Poveda, Lawal was an
LPR charged as deportable in removal proceedings as the result of criminal
convictions. 432 Following his criminal convictions, Lawal had taken a trip
outside the United States and was lawfully readmitted some years prior to
being placed in removal proceedings. 433 He argued that, under Sanchez,
427. Id. Again, the Eleventh Circuit was not able to cite to a Board decision where the
Board had announced this new interpretation. Id.; see also Vastine, supra note 389.
428. Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1172 (“[J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is
especially appropriate in the immigration context.”) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); Id. at 1176 (“The degree of deference is especially great in the field
of immigration.”) (quoting Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 565 F.3d 805, 809 (11th Cir. 2009)).
429. Id. at 1176.
430. See id. at 1176-78.
431. 710 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Vastine, supra note 389 (“Apparently
realizing that Poveda was problematic on many counts, the Eleventh Circuit published
[Lawal] mere months after [Poveda].” (footnote omitted)).
432. Lawal, 710 F.3d at 1289.
433. Id.
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because he would have been inadmissible as the result of his criminal
convictions at the time he was readmitted, he qualified for a nunc pro tunc
212(h) waiver to waive his grounds of deportability. 434 Ultimately, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded Lawal’s case for the Board to reconsider in light
of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Poveda and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Judulang. 435
Although the court in Lawal did not so much as mention deference,
Chevron, or the APA, it discussed the BIA’s decision in Sanchez and
subsequent cases in detail. 436 The court then found that the Eleventh
Circuit’s decisions in Yeung and Poveda called the BIA’s interpretation of
212(h) in Sanchez into doubt. 437 Rather than attempting to unravel that
conundrum on its own, the Eleventh Circuit remanded Lawal’s case to the
Board for it to address this question on its own in the first instance, in effect
indicating deference to the Board’s interpretation.438 Although the panel of
the Eleventh Circuit in Lawal never explicitly called into question the
earlier panel’s decision in Poveda, this acknowledgement of the ambiguity
of the Board’s current position was a significant retreat from the Poveda
panel’s certainty regarding the Board’s interpretation of 212(h) and its
reasonableness. 439
With the possible/partial exception of the Eleventh Circuit, all circuits to
consider the issue in the 212(h) context ultimately reached the exact
opposite conclusion as in the 212(c) context. These courts held that LPRs
with certain criminal convictions who depart the United States and are
seeking readmission may apply for and receive waivers of inadmissibility
under INA section 212(h). However, an identical LPR who has never left
the country is prohibited from even seeking such a waiver unless it is in
conjunction with an application for adjustment of status.

434. Id. at 1289-91.
435. Id. at 1293-94.
436. Id. at 1289-91.
437. Id. at 1291-92.
438. Id. at 1293-94. Unlike the panel in Poveda, the panel in Lawal did not discuss or
rely on the Seventh and Fifth Circuits’ decisions in Klementanovsky and Cabral. Id. The
Board does not appear to have issued any published decision on remand in Lawal. Shortly
after Lawal was remanded, the Board published its decision in Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 130 (BIA 2013). See also Vastine, supra note 389.
439. See, e.g., Vastine, supra note 389 (“[Lawal] clearly indicated that the circuit lacked
the necessary clarity of agency position to rule on the constitutionality and legality of that
position. thus [sic] effectively overruled the precedential value of [Poveda] by
acknowledging the need for determination from the BIA.”).
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3. Contraction
Not only was the expansion of the availability of 212(h) to waive charges
of deportability halted, but the BIA affirmatively contracted that
availability. In Matter of Rivas, the BIA held that INA section 212(h) “does
not provide for an alien in removal proceedings to obtain a ‘stand alone’
waiver without an application for adjustment of status” and “a nunc pro
tunc waiver should not be available to avoid the requirement that an
adjustment application must be concurrently filed with the waiver
request.” 440 The Board’s decision was based almost exclusively on an
interpretation of the language of the statute, particularly the 1996 revisions,
and congressional intent. 441 It held that Congress’ revisions to the INA and
212(h) in 1990 and 1996 had abrogated its prior decision in Sanchez. 442 The
Board did not discuss deference, except insofar as to say the circuit courts
had found its approach limiting the availability of 212(h) reasonable, or
otherwise mention the APA. 443 It did not discuss equal protection except to
note that the use of nunc pro tunc waivers could create equal protection
issues, as they had in the 212(c) context. 444
Rivas was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which sustained the Board’s
position for the reasons given by the Board and by the Eleventh Circuit in
its earlier decision in Poveda. 445 The Eleventh Circuit held again that the
statutory language of the waiver was ambiguous and that the Board’s
interpretation, now clearly articulated in its decision in Rivas, that 212(h)
was not available as a stand-alone waiver of grounds of deportability was
reasonable. 446 The Eleventh Circuit first went through clear and relatively
detailed explanations of the standards for Chevron deference and equal
440. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 132-33.
441. Id. at 131, 133-34. It is worth noting that the Board does use some odd and
potentially inconsistent language to discuss and possibly discredit its previous decision in
Matter of Sanchez in an attempt, it would appear, to justify its position. Id. at 131. The Court
stated: “Because the respondent [in Sanchez] was not eligible for adjustment of status, the
Immigration Judge granted the waiver nunc pro tunc. The respondent’s situation is different
from that of the alien in Sanchez because he does not have a pending application for
adjustment of status.” Id. Either these two sentences are inconsistent, or they are irrational
and mean that a noncitizen could escape the issue simply by filing an unfounded application
to adjust status.
442. Id. at 134 (“Our precedent issued prior to the 1990 and 1996 amendments to section
212(h), including Matter of Sanchez, is therefore no longer valid.”)
443. Id. at 132.
444. Id. at 133-34.
445. Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2014).
446. Id. at 1328.
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protection review in the immigration context.447 While the court does not
specifically invoke Congress’ plenary power, it does seem to emphasize its
own limited role in the immigration context in deference to greater
legislative and executive power.448 The court also mentioned but did not
explain its disagreement with Rivas’ argument that the Board’s new
interpretation of 212(h) “invites arbitrary and capricious agency action,”
presumably a reference to the APA. 449
The court’s analysis did not precisely track the standards it set out, but
appears, like Poveda, to focus primarily on the reasonableness inquiry. 450 It
placed great importance on the fact that the Board’s interpretation was
consistent with the statutory language. 451 In addition, just as in Poveda, the
rational basis analysis appears to have become one factor (and not
necessarily the most important factor) in determining the reasonableness of
the agency’s interpretation. 452 Throughout the decision, the court heavily
cited to and relied on its prior decision in Poveda, the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Klementanovsky, and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cabral. 453
No circuit court appears to have seriously questioned the Board’s
position in Rivas. Unsurprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit (in several
unpublished opinions) has cited primarily to its own decisions in Poveda
and Rivas to support reaching the same conclusion: no stand-alone 212(h)
for LPRs charged as deportable without an application to adjust status. 454
The Third 455 and Fifth 456 Circuits have done the same without further
analysis. In an earlier published decision, the Third Circuit may have left
some minimal room for a challenge to the Board’s interpretation in
Rivas. 457 The court noted in a footnote, without citing to the Board’s
decision in Rivas, that it was not necessary to reach the availability of
447. Id.
448. See id.
449. Id. at 1329.
450. See id. at 1328-30.
451. Id. at 1329.
452. See id. at 1330.
453. Id. at 1328-30.
454. See, e.g., Villava v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 591 Fed. App’x 732, 733, 735-36 (11th Cir.
2014); Alas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 589 Fed. App’x 420, 422-23 (11th Cir. 2014).
455. See, e.g., Cameron v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 641 Fed. App’x 139, 142 (3rd Cir. 2016);
Johnson v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 632 Fed. App’x 728, 730-31 (3rd Cir. 2015).
456. See, e.g., McMaster v. Holder, 587 Fed. App’x 826, 829 (5th Cir. 2014); Zhong Qin
Yang v. Holder, 570 Fed. App’x 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2014). Both decisions also cite to Cabral
v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir. 2011).
457. See Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 783 F.3d 478, 483 n.8 (3rd Cir. 2015).
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stand-alone 212(h) waivers, and it was therefore declining “to address this
question in a precedential opinion at this time.”458
The Sixth Circuit briefly discussed the Board’s interpretation and held in
a single sentence in an unpublished decision: “Grounded in the statutory
text and legitimate equal protection concerns, the BIA's interpretation of the
INA is plainly reasonable and entitled to deference.”459 The Seventh
Circuit, in a case argued before the Board’s decision in Rivas was published
but issued after, left some room to challenge the Board’s new interpretation
abrogating its position in Sanchez: “As the overruling was based on a
statutory interpretation, there may be room for argument to a reviewing
court that the Rivas decision is erroneous.” 460 Relatively quickly, however,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the Board’s decision in Rivas without discussion
of its merits. 461
Only the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Board’s decision in Rivas in any
level of detail in the case of Mtoched v. Lynch. 462 The court first laid out the
Board’s interpretation as articulated in a DOJ regulation, 8 C.F.R. §
1245.1(f), and in its decision in Rivas that a noncitizen in the United States
may apply for a 212(h) waiver only in conjunction with an application to
adjust status. 463 Then the court articulated the standard for Chevron
deference. 464 It held that 212(h) was part of a statutory scheme that the
Attorney General was expressly charged to administer. 465 Although it did
not specifically so state, it apparently found that 212(h) was ambiguous at
Chevron step one, as the majority of its discussion was focused on the
458. Id.
459. Sellers v. Lynch, 630 Fed. App’x 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Palma-Martinez v.
Lynch, 785 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 2015); Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324,
1329-30 (11th Cir. 2014)); see also Fayzullina v. Holder, 777 F.3d 807, 816 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“In any event, the nunc pro tunc waiver concept that was acknowledged for different
purposes in those cases has since been definitively repudiated by the BIA.”).
460. Margulis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 2013).
461. Palma-Martinez, 785 F.3d at 1149-50. The Seventh Circuit also cited to and relied
heavily on its own decision in Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1149.
462. 786 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Garcia v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 789,
793 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing the Board’s decision in Rivas favorably without further
discussion); Ramirez v. Holder, 556 Fed. App’x 613, 614 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing the Board’s
decision in Rivas favorably without further discussion).
463. Mtoched, 786 F.3d at 1217. The Court also noted that this interpretation had been
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Rivas, the Fifth Circuit in Cabral, and the Seventh Circuit
in Klementanovsky. Id. at 1217-18.
464. Id. at 1218.
465. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/1

2017]

212(C) AND 212(H) WAIVERS

183

reasonableness of the agency interpretation at Chevron step two. 466 The
court relied heavily on the fact that the Board’s interpretation was
consistent across both the regulation and its decision in Rivas and with the
statutory language. 467 Although the court was focused on Chevron and did
not discuss the APA, it emphasized (without much discussion) Chevron’s
statement that an agency’s interpretation was reasonable if not arbitrary or
capricious. 468 The Ninth Circuit’s decision contained no discussion of equal
protection or of any similarities or dissimilarities with 212(c) waivers.
This agreement, at least on outcome, and apparent lack of controversy
over virtually ending 212(h)’s availability to waive grounds of deportability
is somewhat surprising given the opposite outcome in the 212(c) cases and
the apparent conflict of the courts’ decisions with the Supreme Court’s
language in Judulang. Some commentators predicted after the Rivas
decision that it would not stand, 469 but given the length of time that has now
passed and the lack of serious court attention to challenges, that outcome
now seems less likely. Just as in the 212(c) context, however, unanswered
questions about other aspects of 212(h) triggering possible application of
constitutional and administrative law doctrines remain.470
4. 212(h): Preliminary Conclusions
Several of the circuit court cases on the applicability of 212(h) to
grounds of deportability specifically referenced Congress’ plenary power in
the immigration context.471 Many of these references were in the context of
466. See id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. See, e.g., Vastine, supra note 389 (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to rationalize the
BIA’s conclusion without instinctively concluding that the distinction in treatment based on
travel is even less intellectually sound than the § 212(c) scheme pilloried by the Supreme
Court in Judulang, particularly since the roots of Judulang are in an unfavorable critique of
§ 212(c) cases that explicitly discriminated against applicants on the basis of foreign travel.
It is overstatement to declare Judulang a ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over the BIA’s §
212(h) holding, but Judulang is evidence that the BIA’s logic in determining eligibility for §
212(h) will be subject to significant (and likely caustic) scrutiny.”).
470. See generally Julianne Lee, Note, Tortured Language: Lawful Permanent Residents
and the 212(h) Waiver, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1201 (2015) (discussing the BIA and circuit
court split on the applicability of the aggravated felony bar in 212(h) to lawful permanent
residents who adjusted their status in the United States as opposed to entering as lawful
permanent residents).
471. See, e.g., Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 339 (11th Cir. 1995); Cabral v. Holder, 632
F.3d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 2011); Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1177 (11th Cir.
2012).
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justifying the application of only minimal scrutiny to equal protection
violations. 472 The BIA in Matter of Yeung also referred to Congress’
“almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in
this country.” 473 Rather than truly being an expression of the limited powers
of the courts in the immigration context, these references appear to be more
of a justification for the approach the court was taking in that particular
case. The Board’s invocation of Congress’ power was particularly selfserving, as it was trying to justify departing from its own precedent in
Sanchez through relying on revisions made by Congress to the INA in
IIRIRA.
Just as in the 212(c) context, the circuit courts did not hesitate to invoke
general principles of constitutional and administrative law in the 212(h)
context. Virtually all of the decisions turned on either equal protection
rational basis review or Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of
212(h). Only the Eleventh Circuit in Lawal even alluded to the possible
applicability of the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review, although
Judulang in the 212(c) context was decided by the Supreme Court using
that framework prior to many of the later 212(h) decisions. 474 While the
application of these doctrines was, if anything, even more entrenched in the
212(h) than the 212(c) cases, the 212(h) cases did not result in the same indepth discussions of the doctrines.
The 212(h) cases were considerably more uniform than the 212(c) cases
as to which administrative and constitutional law doctrines were invoked.
The earlier 212(h) cases turned primarily on the courts’ equal protection
rational basis review, 475 while Poveda and the other later cases incorporated
more reliance on Chevron deference. Given the less extensive discussion of
the doctrines in the 212(h) cases, fewer differences in how each individual
doctrine was interpreted and applied were discernable. In fact, the cases
converged on each other to a somewhat remarkable degree; cross citation

472. See, e.g., Yeung, 76 F.3d at 339; see also Cabral, 632 F.3d at 892; Poveda, 692 F.3d
at 1177.
473. Matter of Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1996).
474. Lawal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 710 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme
Court, however, has recently struck down the BIA's comparable grounds rule as arbitrary
and capricious. Accordingly, on remand, the BIA is also to reconsider Lawal's case in light
of the Supreme Court's holding in Judulang.” (citation omitted)). The Board of Immigration
Appeals in Rivas also cited to Judulang, but without any reference to the APA or arbitrary
and capricious review. Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 133 (BIA 2013).
475. Yeung is the only one of the earlier cases to so much as mention deference, and then
only in a brief paragraph in a revised decision. See Yeung, 76 F.3d at 341.
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was common across circuits to the point that the courts’ reasoning became
circular in some instances. 476
Several patterns are notable. First, prior to the Board’s decision in Rivas,
the courts did not apply a very high level of deference to the agency. Even
within a framework of deference, the courts undertook their own detailed
analyses of the question independently of the agency’s analysis and the
factors that the agency had considered. This is even more remarkable than
in the 212(c) context, given the fact that virtually all of the courts in the
212(h) context agreed with the Board’s interpretation.
Second, even absent the radical differences between and within circuits
in interpreting and applying administrative and constitutional law
principles, extremely significant gaps in the discussion are nevertheless
(further) revealed in the 212(h) context. Despite the overall convergence on
which principles should be applied under which circumstances, the courts
completely fail to discuss their rationale for why those choices are being
made, leaving many difficult questions unanswered. For example, why did
the early circuit court decisions employ only rational basis review even
when an agency interpretation of the provision at issue existed? What
constitutes an agency interpretation that would trigger Chevron deference?
Is APA arbitrary and capricious review rather than Chevron deference ever
appropriate in the 212(h) context? When and why?
In addition, there are significant holes in the discussion of the substantive
standards themselves and what they mean. As in the 212(c) context, many
courts that considered both equal protection and Chevron deference in the
212(h) context collapsed the constitutional question into Chevron’s steptwo reasonableness inquiry. What is the proper place for equal protection
and other constitutional questions? Just how deferential should courts be
when assessing the arbitrariness, capriciousness, or reasonableness of an
agency position? Little guidance is offered in selecting and applying the
appropriate framework(s) for future decision-makers facing the same or
different circumstances.
III. Explanations and Implications
It should be abundantly clear from the above discussion in Part II just
what a tangled mess the case law is with respect to the expansion of 212(c)
and 212(h) waivers to grounds of deportability. Despite dealing with a
relatively narrow, closely related subset of immigration law questions—an
already very specialized area—we face multi-layered, seeming inexplicable
476. See also, e.g., Vastine, supra note 389.
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inconsistencies in outcomes, choice of legal framework, and analysis within
a chosen framework. Section III.A argues that these decisions cannot be
reconciled at the level of outcome, doctrine, or theory.
Despite being irreconcilable, the decisions do illustrate something
important about immigration law and its intersection with administrative
and constitutional law. There are significant parallels in the courts’ analyses
regardless of which of the three legal frameworks—Chevron deference,
APA arbitrary and capricious review, and equal protection rational basis
analysis—is employed. The factors that courts consider and the weight that
they give to those factors are substantially similar whether the court is
determining if the agency’s action is reasonable at Chevron step two, if the
agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under the APA, or if a statutory
distinction is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Section
III.B.1 highlights these parallels from the discussion of the case law in Part
II.
Section III.B.2 discusses the significance of these parallels to our
understanding of immigration law and its relationship to administrative and
constitutional law today. They reveal the uneasy relationships that
originated in the theory of immigration exceptionalism and have always
existed among the courts, the executive branch, and Congress in the
immigration context. The theory of immigration exceptionalism has clearly
eroded, as evidenced in the courts’ consistent and unquestioning application
of these constitutional and administrative law principles. At the same time,
remnants of the theory still appear to be creating a certain tension in the
courts’ decisions regarding the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h). Although
administrative and constitutional doctrines are being applied, the
explanation of what these doctrines mean and how they apply in the
immigration law context has been stunted. Detailed development of these
questions will be an important next step if the theory of immigration
exceptionalism is to continue to erode.
A. Irreconcilable Differences
The currently applicable rules on the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h) to
waive deportability for LPRs can be summarized at the most basic level of
generality. As detailed in Part II, the agency and courts have reached
essentially opposite conclusions in the two contexts. The former section
212(c) is available to waive all grounds of deportability except those
corresponding to a ground of inadmissibility specifically excluded in the
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statutory language. 477 Section 212(h), on the other hand, may never be used
as a stand-alone waiver of deportability, including nunc pro tunc; it may
only be used to overcome deportability in conjunction with an application
to adjust status. 478 Section III.A.1 argues that these different outcomes are
not reconcilable; 212(c) and 212(h) cannot be meaningfully distinguished
with respect to their applicability to deportation.
Part II also illustrated clearly that the 212(c) and 212(h) cases differ not
only in outcome but also in their choice of legal framework and analysis
within a chosen framework. Section III.A.2 will argue that the use of
doctrine or theory cannot help to reconcile these legal frameworks and
analyses in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases.
1. Sections 212(c) and 212(h) Are Not Distinguishable
While the Board in Sanchez 479 and the Eleventh Circuit in Yeung 480
specifically analogized to 212(c) in cases dealing with 212(h), the later
agency and court opinions all agreed that 212(h) and 212(c) were somehow
different. Many decisions in the 212(h) expansion cases ignored the
obvious similarities with 212(c) and simply reached the opposite conclusion
without even attempting to distinguish 212(h) from 212(c). 481 Those courts
that did try to differentiate 212(h) relied primarily on an argument related to
the equal protection analysis: courts attempted to define the similarly
situated groups differently for 212(h). 482 When examined more closely, this
argument cannot stand. Despite these courts’ efforts, there is no way to
meaningfully distinguish between the applicability of 212(c) and 212(h)
waivers to grounds of deportability.
The 212(h) opinions described the court in Francis as being concerned
with the distinction being made between two different groups of deportable
LPRs: those who had traveled outside the United States and those who had

477. See Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 265-66 (BIA 2014).
478. See Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 132-33.
479. Matter of Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218, 223 (BIA 1980) (citing Matter of Tanori,
15 I. & N. Dec. 566 (BIA 1976)).
480. Yeung, 76 F.3d at 340-41.
481. See generally Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2014); Montano v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 350 Fed. App’x 643 (3rd Cir. 2009); Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130.
482. See generally Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1177 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Chuang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2004) and LaGuerre
v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998)); Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 893-94 (5th
Cir. 2011); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041.
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not. 483 The courts in the 212(h) cases, on the other hand, chose to describe
the two groups as those who were being deported and those who were being
excluded. 484 Although this may be a technically accurate description of
what the Second Circuit in Francis said, it is a false distinction because it
misses an important point.
The court in Francis and the Board in Silva were actually concerned with
the very same two groups as the courts in the 212(h) cases: LPRs with
criminal convictions who had traveled outside the country and LPRs with
criminal convictions who had not. In Francis and the other pre-1996 cases,
LPRs in the first group who had traveled outside the country could still be
charged as deportable on their return.485 In the post-1996 212(h) cases,
these very same LPRs would be charged as inadmissible because of
changes made by IIRIRA to the definition of who is seeking admission. 486
To repeat, the members of the first group are identical in the 212(c) and
212(h) contexts. For purposes of equal protection, whether a group is in fact
similarly situated, or whether Congress had a rational basis for singling that
group out for disparate treatment, cannot turn solely on how that group is
described. 487
483. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976); see, e.g., Poveda, 692 F.3d at
1177; Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94; Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 793-94.
484. See, e.g., Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Chuang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F.3d
1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2004) and LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir.
1998)); Cabral, 632 F.3d at 893-94; Klementanovsky, 501 F.3d at 793-94 (citing LaGuerre,
164 F.3d at 1041).
485. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (amended 1996); Rosenberg v. Fleuti,
374 U.S. 449, 452, (1963); see also Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1175 (11th
Cir. 2012). Entry without inspection was also a ground of deportability pre-1996 but is now
a ground of inadmissibility. Compare INA § 241(a)(1)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(ii)
(amended and transferred 1996) (making being present in the United States after having
entered without inspection a ground of deportability) with INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (a)(6)(A) (2012) (making being present in the U.S. after having entered without
inspection a ground of inadmissibility).
486. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
301(a)(13)(C)(v), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); see also Lawal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 710 F.3d 1288,
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2013); Aschenbrenner, supra note 118, at 169-70.
487. Furthermore, it is somewhat difficult to argue that Congress had a rational basis for
delineating the division between the grounds of inadmissibility and the grounds of
deportability in the first instance. There is illogicality in the grounds of deportability and
inadmissibility themselves. Why are aggravated felonies, or firearms offenses, or crimes of
domestic violence grounds of deportability but not grounds of inadmissibility? See INA §
101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012); INA §
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This distinction between the 212(h) and 212(c) context seems almost
pretextual, as though the courts wanted to reach a different conclusion in
the 212(h) context and were looking for a justification to do so. Because
212(c) is now available only retroactively to waive convictions occurring
prior to IIRIRA, 212(c) cases are likely to eventually taper off over time.
Section 212(h), however, remains available to waive current and future
convictions. The courts may have been trying to avoid the plethora of
litigation and complexities that have characterized 212(c) in an ongoing
context like 212(h).
Courts and commentators may also argue that 212(c) is a special,
peculiar context, and should not be used to draw deductions applicable to
other immigration law issues, such as 212(h). Section 212(c) cases
necessarily involve the intersection of not only immigration law but also
complex questions of retroactivity, equal protection, and administrative
law. It is highly tempting to dismiss this area of law as an aberration, a
highly technical wrinkle driven by the overlap of several areas of long-past,
and possibly mistaken, precedent in the already complex morass of
immigration law. Indeed, once the 212(c) cases are removed from the
analysis in Part II above, the 212(h) cases viewed alone appear at first blush
much more consistent and less problematic. Considering, given the repeal
of 212(c), 212(c) claims will eventually no longer arise, what would be the
harm in simply writing off this area for purposes of future analysis? Under
this theory, the inconsistencies are in fact irreconcilable, but it does not
matter because the 212(c) context is aberrational.
Many of the courts hearing these cases would seem likely to agree with
this diagnosis. The First Circuit described “the combined effect of § 212(c)
and the interpretation in Francis and its aftermath” as “an untidy
patchwork, even, one might say, a mess.” 488 The Second Circuit highlighted
237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012). Arguments can and have been made in
support of this of course, including the fact that those charged as deportable have violated a
trust or opportunity and may have caused harm inside the United States. Considered at the
most basic level, however, how can this be rational? If a criminal offense is considered to be
“bad” enough to deport someone, how can it not be “bad” enough to warrant keeping
someone out of the country in the first place? The movement of individuals from one
category to another, such as those who entered without inspection could also support an
argument against rationality. Compare INA § 241(a)(1)(C)(ii),8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(ii)
(amended and transferred 1996) (making being present in the U.S. after having entered
without inspection a ground of deportability) with INA § 212(a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1186(a)(6)(A) (2012) (making being present in the U.S. after having entered without
inspection a ground of inadmissibility).
488. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 315 (1st Cir. 1992).
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the inherent complexities by beginning their opinion in Blake with the
following sentence: “At issue is a judicial amendment to an unconstitutional
statute now repealed.” 489 Even the Supreme Court expressed similar
sentiments during oral argument in Judulang. Justice Breyer described it as
an “arcane area of the law,” 490 and Justice Ginsburg described the cases as
“a very confusing set of decisions.” 491 Justice Alito described a particular
circumstance caused by the 212(c) cases as “bizarre.” 492 Justice Kennedy
asked at one point if the Court had to “just say we're in this wilderness and
we can't get out?” 493
Despite its admitted complexity, and these strong sentiments from the
courts, 212(c) cannot be so easily dismissed as an aberration. Section
212(c) and the case law interpreting it are not such a departure from the
more typical context that they cannot be used to make general deductions
and predictions. This is most clear by looking at the stark similarity of the
issues discussed in the 212(h) context above. It is also illustrated by the fact
that the Supreme Court has heard multiple cases in the 212(c) context;494
this would have been unlikely to occur had the Court not understood these
questions as having broader implications and applicability. 495 In fact, the
Supreme Court has substantively cited its 212(c) cases in other contexts. 496
Furthermore, the complexity of the questions presented can be a benefit, as
it highlights potential issues with the doctrine as seen in the discussion of
the case law above.

489. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 90 (2nd Cir. 2007).
490. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
491. Id. at 15.
492. Id. at 17.
493. Id. at 18.
494. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Judulang, 565 U.S. 42.
495. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c) (providing reasons that the Supreme Court may consider in
determining whether to grant certiorari); Margaret Meriweather Cordray & Richard Cordray,
The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case
Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 391 (2004) (analyzing “the gatekeeping choices that the
Justices make as they set the direction in which the Court will proceed”).
496. See, e.g., Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2015 (2012) (citing
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. at 45-49); Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1484-85 (2012)
(citing Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45-48); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1176 (2012)
(citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001)); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363 (2010)
(citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296); Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 19 (2008) (citing St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 320); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 30, 43 (2006) (citing St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 289).
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2. Doctrine and Theory Cannot Help to Reconcile 212(c) and 212(h)
If the 212(c) and 212(h) expansion cases cannot be reconciled on their
face, then the next question is whether some doctrine or theory can be
applied to reconcile them now or for the future. This section considers
whether immigration exceptionalism, Chevron deference, or ABA arbitrary
and capricious review may provide an explanation for—or better yet a way
out of—the current morass. I ultimately conclude that these doctrines and
theory also do not help to reconcile the 212(c) and 212(h) cases, although
some may help point to a way forward.
a) Immigration Exceptionalism?
First, the utility of a theory of immigration exceptionalism in this context
is easily rejected. It may explain differences in doctrine and application
between immigration law and other areas of the law, but as previously
discussed, commentators are now questioning whether or not even these
differences really continue to exist.497 In any event, a theory that
immigration law differs from other specialty areas of law certainly does not,
or should not be allowed to, explain discrepancies and confusion within
immigration law. Furthermore, even if one accepts the premise that
Congress has plenary power over immigration, it cannot explain why courts
should have essentially unrestrained discretion to act in the immigration
context, as sometimes seems to have occurred in the 212(c) and 212(h)
cases.
b) Chevron as Explanation or Savior?
A second possibility is that looking closely at the role of Chevron can
explain what is going on in these cases. At first blush, this is an appealing
theory. The initial cases regarding the expansion of 212(c) to the
deportability context, Francis and Silva, were decided prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron, while the cases regarding the expansion of
212(h) to waive deportability were decided after. 498 Although deference to
agency action was not nonexistent prior to Chevron, it was not nearly as
497. See generally LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 220-22; Aleinikoff, supra
note 19, at 34; Johnson, supra note 6; Kagan, supra note 17; Legomsky, supra note 5, at
930-37; Motomura, supra note 7, at 1372-73; Motomura, supra note 6, at 574-600;
Rosenbloom, supra note 12, at 1983 n.129 (“A number of scholars have chronicled the
emergence of cracks in the plenary power doctrine over the decades.”); Spiro, supra note 16,
at 341-45.
498. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976).
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clearly articulated or established as it became in Chevron’s aftermath. 499
Perhaps the application of Chevron deference in the 212(h) cases and not
the 212(c) cases could somehow explain the opposite outcomes reached in
those two sets of decisions. This explanation could, in theory, be related to
the circuit courts’ greater freedom and authority to decide constitutional
issues; to the respective likelihoods of the courts and the agency to reach
decisions favorable to the noncitizen respondent; or to some other factor
related to or arising out of the exercise of Chevron deference.
Despite its potential appeal, this theory ultimately proves untrue as a
factual matter. First, Chevron was only invoked in three of the pre-Rivas
212(h) cases. 500 In the others, there was no indication that the Court was
deferring to the agency’s decision. 501 Therefore, it is unlikely that Chevron
could be the explanation for the different outcomes reached. Second, the
cases considering which grounds of deportability could be waived by
212(c) leading up to Judulang demonstrate that the application of Chevron
is not nearly so straightforward. Even when invoked, Chevron can be
interpreted and applied in a variety of ways and therefore does not
necessarily result in a particular or consistent outcome. Furthermore, the
pre-Judulang 212(c) decisions demonstrated a fair amount of discrepancy
and seeming randomness with respect to when the courts invoked Chevron
in the first instance, thereby giving the invocation of Chevron little
predictive or explanatory power.
Even if Chevron cannot explain the existing incoherence, perhaps
clarifying the application of Chevron can fix the inconsistency moving
forward. Multiple possible Chevron critiques and fixes have been proposed
in various contexts. One fix focuses on the role of constitutional avoidance
in the Chevron two-step test. Commentators have long suggested that
constitutional avoidance is a canon of statutory interpretation that should be
applied to interpret the statute at Chevron step one.502 This follows logically
499. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 13, at 1681; Lawson & Kam, supra note 21, at 6-9.
500. See Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014); Poveda v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1176-78 (11th Cir. 2012); Yeung v. INS, 72 F.3d 843, 843 (11th
Cir. 1996); cf. Lawal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 710 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013) (not mentioning
deference or Chevron, but remanding for the Board to clarify their interpretation of 212(h)).
501. Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 2011); Montano v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
350 Fed. App’x 643 (3rd Cir. 2009); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 792 (7th
Cir. 2007).
502. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (“A majority, including the
Supreme Court, argues that courts should continue to interpret legislation independently
when normative canons would apply, even when Congress has charged a particular agency
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both from the nature of step one (to determine what the statute says and
whether it is unambiguous) 503 and from the fact that administrative agencies
like the BIA have only limited jurisdiction over constitutional issues. 504 If
an agency cannot ultimately decide and has no expertise in constitutional
issues, perhaps it does not make sense to defer to that agency’s
interpretation of a statute with constitutional implications. Focusing the
identification and resolution of constitutional issues at step one would avoid
having to ask this difficult question at step two.
Alternatively, courts could clarify that the analysis of whether a
particular interpretation triggers constitutional issues should block the
application of Chevron deference altogether 505 or should happen during
Chevron’s step two reasonableness inquiry. 506 A position that questionable
constitutional issues should take adjudication outside the scope of Chevron
with the statute’s administration.”); cf. Cox, supra note 13, at 1672-79 (arguing that judicial
skepticism of agency decisions may reflect the position that certain types of decisions, such
as statutes raising potential constitutional issues, are better left to Congress than to
administrative agencies). But see Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 607-09 (“The
relationship between Chevron and these other interpretive tools raises a host of difficult and
important issues, yet judges and scholars are sometimes distracted by the question whether
this or that interpretive tool ought to come into play at Step One or Step Two, instead of
focusing on the real questions.”).
503. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
504. Matter of Fitzpatrick, 26 I. & N. Dec. 559, 562 (BIA 2015) (“[W]e have no
authority to rule on the constitutionality of the laws enacted by Congress.”); Matter of
Fuentes-Campos, 21 I. & N. Dec. 905, 912 (BIA 1997) (“It is well settled that we lack
jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations we administer.”);
Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration
judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the
regulations.”).
505. See, e.g., Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 191-96 (2015);
Slocum, supra note 31, at 546 (“One clear statement canon that seems to clearly displace
Chevron deference is the constitutional question avoidance canon, which directs that ‘if an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
and where an alternative interpretation of a statute is “fairly possible,” . . . [reviewing courts]
are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.’”(alterations in original)); Cass
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000) (describing the
canon of constitutional avoidance as trumping Chevron on the theory that Congress, not the
agency, must choose to raise constitutionally sensitive questions).
506. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 502, at 68 (arguing that normative canons such as
constitutional avoidance should be applied in a contextual inquiry as part of the
reasonableness assessment at Chevron step two); Slocum, supra note 31, at 573-82 (arguing
that the immigration rule of lenity, another canon of statutory construction, should be
employed as part of Chevron step two).
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deference would place constitutional considerations even more squarely
within the control of the courts and Congress. Placing the inquiry at
Chevron step two, on the other hand, would give the agency some voice on
constitutional questions. Under this approach, if an agency’s legal
interpretation is unconstitutional, or perhaps even merely presents
constitutional issues, the courts would find that agency position
unreasonable. This is in fact what many of the courts appear to have done in
the 212(c) and 212(h) contexts, but without explicitly so stating or
explaining why they chose to address constitutional issues at step two rather
than step one. For purposes of this discussion, exactly where the
constitutional consideration—here, equal protection—comes into play is
less important than clarity on what is occurring and why. Explicit
articulation and consideration in the case law of the role of equal protection
in or outside of Chevron deference, even if there is disagreement among
courts, should eventually lead to greater uniformity and predictability.
A second solution focuses on Chevron step zero: determining whether
Chevron is triggered in the first instance.507 This inquiry can involve
multiple questions, including whether the agency is interpreting a statute it
is charged with administering, whether the agency position takes a form
that merits deference from the courts, and whether Chevron or some other
standard of deference is most appropriate. 508 Clarifying the standard for
determining when Chevron does or does not apply would do much to avoid
the distortion of the standard and the confusion that has resulted in the
212(c) and 212(h) contexts.
Clarifying the application of Chevron in all respects as a means of
reconciling inconsistencies in the 212(c) and 212(h) contexts, and even in
other aspects of immigration law, has significant merit for all the reasons
discussed above. Alone, however, it could not resolve the inconsistencies
and incoherence surrounding 212(c) and 212(h) and their expansion to
waive grounds of deportability. The 212(h) cases turn in significant part on
the fact that the courts found no equal protection concerns, holding in most
cases that there were multiple rational reasons for treating noncitizens
seeking admission differently than noncitizens facing deportation. Even the
most perfect and complete Chevron fix, then, could not rationalize the
opposite outcomes in 212(c) and 212(h) cases. Chevron, equal protection,
and other administrative procedures are profoundly interconnected, at least
507. See generally Holper, supra note 30; Sunstein, supra note 30.
508. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All
These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741-50 (2014); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 33, at
1098-120.
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in this immigration context. I argue in Section III.B below that these
interconnections must be fully considered both for the 212(c) and 212(h)
problem and for the future of immigration law more generally.
c) Judulang as Savior?
If Chevron cannot reconcile the 212(c) and 212(h) mess, perhaps
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA can. Some commentators
have presented the Supreme Court’s opinion in Judulang as not only a
recognition of the problem but also a wakeup call for the agency. 509 This
theory is also very appealing. The Court used strong language in Judulang
to criticize the arbitrariness of the Board’s interpretation of 212(c) in Blake
and Brieva. 510 The decision has been seen as a warning to the agency that it
must provide reasoned, rational explanations for its legal interpretations or
the federal courts will overturn them under the APA.511
There is some indication that the Board has received this message. The
Board’s opinion in Matter of Abdelghany, announcing its new interpretation
for when 212(c) will be available to waive charges of deportability after the
old rule was abrogated in Judulang, is twenty pages long. 512 The Board
explained at length the various possible alternative rules it considered and
why it rejected them. 513 The Board then clearly stated what the rule will be
moving forward. 514 The Board went even further, however, and attempted
to clarify its position on other remaining questions regarding eligibility for
212(c) relief in an effort to provide a comprehensive and definitive
resolution. 515 But in other contexts—for example the Board’s recent
opinion in Matter of Rivas taking away the ability for noncitizens charged
as deportable to be granted stand-alone 212(h) relief nunc pro tunc to a
prior entry—the same lack of clarity and rationality still creep in.516
Even if the agency perfectly heeds Judulang’s call for clarity and
rationality, however, it will not be sufficient to solve the problems
509. See, e.g., Glen, supra note 69, at 2; Kevin Johnson, Opinion Analysis: Judulang v.
Holder, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 13, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/
opinion-analysis-judulang-v-holder/.
510. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53-63 (2011).
511. See, e.g., Glen, supra note 69, at 2; Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How
Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policymaking Authority and Opens Channels for
Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 37 (2012).
512. Matter of Abdelgheny, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014).
513. Id. at 261-65.
514. Id. at 265-66.
515. Id. at 266-72.
516. Matter of Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130 (BIA 2013).
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identified above. As should be obvious from the circuit court decisions
discussed here, the courts of appeals are easily as much, if not more of, an
issue than the agency itself. It is the decisions of the courts of appeals that
have contributed most significantly to the inconsistencies, errors, and
inexplicability of the 212(c)/212(h) context. Furthermore, as discussed
above in relation to Chevron, arbitrary and capricious review, Chevron
deference, and equal protection are all profoundly interconnected in these
cases. Any comprehensive solution must also consider these relationships.
B. Summary and Significance of the Parallels
The fact that the 212(c) and 212(h) decisions cannot be explained or
reconciled at the level of outcome, doctrine, or theory leads to some
important insights regarding immigration exceptionalism, immigration law
today, and immigration law’s intersection with administrative and
constitutional law. The application of ordinary administrative and
constitutional law principles—specifically Chevron deference, arbitrary and
capricious review, and equal protection rational basis analysis—by the
courts deciding the 212(c) and 212(h) cases demonstrates a clear,
continuing erosion of the plenary power doctrine. Analyzing the application
of these principles further, there are significant parallels in the courts’
analyses regardless of which of the three legal frameworks are employed.
Assessing whether an agency’s legal interpretation is reasonable under step
two of the Chevron analysis looks a great deal like analyzing whether an
agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the
APA, which in turn looks a great deal like considering whether there is a
rational basis for a particular action under minimal scrutiny equal protection
review. Section III.B.1 explores the historical roots of these parallels and
draws attention to their occurrence in the case law from Part II.
Courts have only extremely rarely noted these parallels and have never
analyzed their significance. This failure is one facet of a larger issue: the
courts in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases have primarily engaged in only a
surface application of the constitutional and administrative law principles
discussed. Section III.B.2 argues that the fact that these courts have not
engaged in a deeper analysis of the intersection of these principles or
attempted to answer the remaining questions regarding these doctrines
highlighted throughout this article is a remnant of plenary power and
immigration law exceptionalism. Deeper attempts to explain what these
doctrines mean, when and how they apply in the immigration law context,
and how they interconnect will be the next step in the erosion of
immigration exceptionalism.
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1. Summary of the Parallels
Considering the immigration, constitutional, and administrative law
tracks simultaneously shows us that there are significant parallels among
the analyses under each of the three separate frameworks discussed here.
The factors that the courts consider and the weight that they give to those
factors are substantially similar whether the court is determining if the
agency’s action is reasonable at Chevron step two, if the agency’s action is
arbitrary and capricious under the APA, or if a statutory distinction is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest in an equal protection
analysis. These parallels are not just a recent development, but have roots in
the origin and history of each doctrine.
First, the Chevron reasonableness inquiry shares significant overlap with
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review.517 In fact, the Supreme Court in
Judulang explicitly acknowledged the analogy between Chevron
reasonableness and arbitrary and capricious review. 518 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Judulang is the first, and surprisingly the only, major
decision in the 212(c) and 212(h) context to explicitly apply arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA. In a footnote declining the government’s
urging to decide the case under Chevron deference, the Court found that,
even if they had done so, “our analysis would be the same, because under
Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is arbitrary or
capricious in substance.” 519 At the same time, the Court in Judulang
expanded the factors courts consider under arbitrary and capricious review
in immigration cases.520 Rather than focusing primarily on the process by
which the agency reached its policy interpretation, the courts now look at
the substantive merits of that policy. 521 The end result is that arbitrary and
capricious review looks even more like the Chevron reasonableness inquiry.

517. An important unresolved question is how a court should determine when to apply
Chevron deference versus when to apply arbitrary and capricious review. See, e.g., Beerman,
supra note 508, at 741 (“A major problem with the Chevron doctrine, going back to the
immediate aftermath of the Chevron decision itself, has been the lack of a discernible
boundary between cases that should be resolved using Chevron deference and cases that
should be resolved under some other doctrine, such as the less deferential Skidmore
deference, non-deferential statutory construction, or arbitrary or capricious review under the
Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A).”).
518. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011).
519. Id. (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
52 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
520. Cf. Stein, supra note 511, at 48-52.
521. Id.
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This correspondence did not originate in Judulang but has deep historical
roots. The Supreme Court in Chevron used both terms appearing in the
APA—arbitrary and capricious—to help define when an agency’s action
was reasonable: “Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.” 522
This overlap in language can be traced throughout the 212(c) and 212(h)
cases. The Court in Judulang uses the term “reasonable” in evaluating the
agency’s interpretation. 523 Other decisions, both 212(c) and 212(h), employ
the arbitrary and capricious language as part of their Chevron analysis. For
example, the Fifth Circuit in Vo, in assessing the reasonableness of the
agency’s
212(c)
comparable-grounds
interpretation,
concluded:
“Accordingly, Vo has not demonstrated a substantial shift in agency
practice sufficient to render the BIA’s interpretation of its own regulation
irrational or arbitrary and capricious.”524 The Ninth Circuit in Mtoched also
uses the arbitrary and capricious language in describing and applying the
Chevron reasonableness analysis to the agency’s 212(h) interpretation.525
Even more significant than the overlap in language is the correspondence
in the factors that the courts actually consider when engaging in the
Chevron reasonableness analysis and arbitrary and capricious review. In
Judulang’s arbitrary and capricious review, the Court focused on its
conclusion
that the BIA's approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the
purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of
the immigration system. A method for disfavoring deportable
aliens that bears no relation to these matters—that neither
focuses on nor relates to an alien's fitness to remain in the
country—is arbitrary and capricious.526
The Supreme Court was also troubled that the Board’s comparable-grounds
approach meant that whether or not a noncitizen was eligible for 212(c)
relief would turn on “the fortuitous chance” of an individual officer’s
charging decision. 527 Finally, the Court also considered the consistency of
522. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
523. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55 (“The problem with the comparable-grounds policy is that
it does not impose such a reasonable limitation.” (emphasis added)).
524. Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2007)
525. Mtoched v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2015).
526. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55.
527. Id. at 58.
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the Board’s interpretation with the statutory language, consistency of the
Board’s position across time, and cost and efficiency considerations offered
by the Board. 528 These very same factors were at play in those 212(c) and
212(h) cases where the courts engaged in Chevron’s step-two
reasonableness inquiry and offered substantive discussion of the agency’s
position 529 beyond citation to prior decisions.530
Second, both administrative law doctrines demonstrate remarkable
similarity with equal protection rational basis review. Courts in immigration
cases, dating back to at least the Second Circuit’s 1975 Francis decision,
have consistently used similar formulations of the minimal scrutiny, or
rational basis, standard: “Under the minimal scrutiny test, . . . distinctions
between different classes of ‘persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”531 This formulation uses both the
term “reasonable” from Chevron and the term “arbitrary” from arbitrary
and capricious review.
As previously discussed, historically arbitrary and capricious review and
rational basis analysis have been understood to have substantial similarities.
While the Supreme Court officially rejected any comparison between
arbitrary and capricious review and the highly deferential rational basis test
then used in constitutional due process analysis in 1983, 532 this formulation
and the correspondence between the two different tests nevertheless seems
528. Id. at 59-64.
529. See, e.g., Mtoched, 786 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2015) (considering consistency
with the statute, the regulation, and Board precedent); Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d
1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014) (considering consistency with the statutory language); Abebe I,
493 F.3d 1092, 1101-05 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering consistency with the statute,
regulations, and past agency practice); Vo, 482 F.3d 363, 369-72 (5th Cir. 2007)
(considering consistency with past agency precedent); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939,
950-52 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering consistency with the statutory language); cf. Poveda v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 1176-78 (11th Cir. 2012) (focusing on the equal protection
question within the reasonableness inquiry).
530. For cases falling into the latter category, where the courts did not actually analyze
the reasonableness of the agency position, see, for example, De La Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 166 (3rd Cir. 2007);
Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455,
1460-61 (11th Cir. 1994); and Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1993).
531. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
532. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9
(1983).
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to have stuck in the immigration context.533 Furthermore, as previously
highlighted, courts appear to not only have considered reasonableness as
part of the rational basis test but to have collapsed that analysis into
Chevron step two. 534 The extremely close linkages among all three of these
legal frameworks are thus readily apparent.
2. Significance of the Parallels
The vast majority of the courts deciding 212(c) and 212(h) cases have
apparently not noticed and have not commented on these parallels. The
Supreme Court in Judulang was the first major decision to begin to make
this connection, and it did so in only a very limited manner. 535 The Court’s
brief discussion was contained in a footnote. 536 It was concerned only with
the relationship between step two of Chevron deference and arbitrary and
capricious review; it did not address equal protection. It recognized the
pattern by noting that its analysis of whether the Board’s interpretation was
reasonable under Chevron would be the same as its analysis that the
Board’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. It did not, however,
consider the significance or implications of this conclusion. The Court
stated briefly that it found arbitrary and capricious review to be the
appropriate legal framework because the Board was not interpreting a
statute, but did not fully explore the question of choice of legal framework.
It thus left a number of questions unanswered.
The limitations of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Judulang and the
failure of courts generally to note these parallels is one facet of a larger
issue: the courts in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases have primarily engaged in
only a surface application of the constitutional and administrative law
principles discussed. As previously discussed, these decisions result in
numerous outstanding issues. For example, the majority of the courts made
no attempt to explain why they were selecting a particular legal framework
533. See, e.g., Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1995); Komarenko v. INS, 35
F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
2014); Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1176-78; De La Rosa, 579 F.3d at 1337-39; Abebe II, 554 F.3d
1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curium); Abebe I, 493 F.3d 1092, 1104-1105 (9th
Cir. 2007); Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 163, 165. But cf. Brooks, supra note 36, at 268-69 n.99
(“Although courts continue to use phrases like ′rational basis′ and ′reasoned decisionmaking′ when performing arbitrary and capricious review, the actual test being applied is not
nearly as deferential as the constitutional rational basis test.” (citations omitted)).
534. See, e.g., Rivas, 765 F.3d at 1330; Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1176-78; Abebe I, 493 F.3d
at 1104-05; Vo, 482 F.3d at 369-70, 371-72; Leal-Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 950.
535. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011).
536. Id.
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or combination of frameworks. They did not address how or why Chevron
deference, arbitrary and capricious review, and equal protection rational
basis analysis fit together. They left open many questions specific to each
individual doctrine.
The theory of immigration exceptionalism has clearly eroded, as
evidenced in the courts’ consistent and unquestioning application of
constitutional and administrative law principles. At the same time, remnants
of the theory still appear to be creating a certain tension in the courts’
decisions regarding the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h). This tension
reveals the uneasy relationships that originated in the theory of immigration
exceptionalism and have always existed among the courts, the executive
branch, and Congress in the immigration context. The fact that these courts
have not engaged in a deeper analysis of the intersection of these principles
or attempted to answer the remaining questions regarding these doctrines
highlighted throughout this article is a remnant of plenary power and
immigration law exceptionalism. While administrative and constitutional
doctrines are being applied, the explanation of what these doctrines mean
and how they apply in the immigration law context has been stunted by this
historical tension.
Deeper attempts to explain what these doctrines mean, when and how
they apply in the immigration law context, and how they interconnect will
be the next step in the erosion of immigration exceptionalism. The Supreme
Court took a significant step in this direction in its opinion in Judulang. The
courts, however, appear to have moved backward again in much of their
recent 212(h) jurisprudence. Like the initial cracks in the plenary power
doctrine, this progress is likely to be slow, non-linear, and to proceed on its
own timetable.
Conclusion
The courts’ decisions on the expansion of 212(c) and 212(h) waivers to
the grounds of deportability are irreconcilable in both outcome and
doctrine. It is unjustifiably inconsistent to allow 212(c) waivers to waive
virtually all grounds of deportability, but to allow 212(h) to waive virtually
none. Furthermore, the courts’ choices of legal framework in these cases
among Chevron deference, arbitrary and capricious review, and equal
protection are incoherent. Even within a single doctrine, there is no
uniformity in interpretation and application. By looking at the factors that
the courts have considered in these cases, however, it is possible to identify
significant parallels. What the courts are actually doing in assessing
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable at step two of Chevron
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looks very much like what they are doing in assessing whether an agency’s
position is arbitrary and capricious under the APA, which in turn looks very
much like what they are doing in assessing whether there is a rational basis
for a distinction under equal protection review.
The fact that the courts are regularly applying these ordinary principles
of administrative and constitutional law in the immigration context at all
illustrates a continuing erosion of the plenary power doctrine and the theory
of immigration exceptionalism. However, immigration exceptionalism has
nevertheless had a lasting impact on the cases. The courts’ failure to
identify and analyze the parallels noted above and to engage in a deep
analysis of the constitutional and administrative law principles being
applied generally is a remnant of plenary power and immigration
exceptionalism. This is likely to be the next facet of immigration
exceptionalism to crumble, bringing immigration law ever so slowly closer
to mainstream legal doctrine. So doing may help the courts focus on the
underlying purpose for their analysis and avoid getting caught up in the
minutiae and technicalities of the doctrine. This much-needed paradigm
shift will build consistency and coherence and will reduce legal errors in
immigration jurisprudence.
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